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Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the
New Libertarian Supreme Court
By JOHN E. NOWAK*
Introduction
Another Term of the Supreme Court has come and gone, leaving
few surprises in its wake. As with most recent Terms, one could have
guessed in advance the topics, outcomes, and voting divisions for most
of the cases: racial minority groups will win, but not very much;'
aliens, illegitimates, and women will win only when laws are shock-
ingly open in their discrimination against them;2 some procedural pro-
tection will be given to those who have a clearly defined liberty or
property interest at stake in a government proceeding 3 (but not to
others);4 fundamental rights such as voting or privacy will not be ex-
tended,5 except for a woman's right to an abortion;6 poor people will
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Ms. Charlene Quigley and Ms. Roberta Shallenberger, third year students at the College,
and Mr. J. Brian DeBoice, Class of 1979, for their assistance in the preparation of this arti-
cle. The author also wishes to express his indebtedness to his colleagues Francis A. Boyle,
Daniel A. Farber and Ronald D. Rotunda for their critical reading of the manuscript.
1. Compare Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979) andDayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) (transfer of students required to correct earlier de
jure segregation in school districts) with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (no in-
terdistrict remedy for de jure segregation in city surrounded by suburbs with de facto segre-
gated schools). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (exclusion of aliens from positions
as public school teachers upheld); Lalli v. La~li, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (requirement of judicial
finding of paternity during life of father as prerequisite to inheritance from father by illegiti-
mate child upheld). Compare Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (limitation of alimony to wives
invalidated) with Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (veterans pref-
erence in civil service employment upheld despite adverse impact on women).
3. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) (juveniles entitled to informal screen-
ing process at time of being committed to state operated mental health care institution by
their parents or guardian).
4. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 99 S.
Ct. 2100 (1979) (persons eligible for parole have no interest in fair parole hearing procedure
that merits any due process protection).
5. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (unincorporated com-
munity residents have no right to vote in city elections even though they are subject to some
city regulations), Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting to denial of certiorari in a case where lower courts had employed a rational basis
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lose;7 and so will the press8 (though perhaps not so terribly much).9
The precise holdings of the cases, of course, are worth noting,10 but I
would suggest that the work of the Court can best be evaluated by the
identification of a "historic' Supreme Court rather than the dissection
of individual decisions. This is not a really new suggestion for it mir-
rors the approach of our greatest constitutional scholars from 1900 to
1960; indeed, this foreword may be no more than an .update of the
analyses of Court activity which were undertaken by McCloskey,"
Swisher,12 and Wright.13
By a historic Court I do not mean to identify a Supreme Court
capable of "making history" but, rather, a period of Court history
wherein its decisions reflect the use of a specific political philosophy by
the Court. A historic Supreme Court differs from a transitional Court,
which exists when the justices do not have an identifiable majority po-
sition. A historic Court may not have any particular justice or justices
whose leadership causes the Court to follow a particular path. Indeed,
the historic Court may not have the ability to issue many majority
opinions because there may be different pairings of the nine justices
coming together to make the five member majorities in specific cases.
What is important in the identification of a historic Court is that the
test to uphold the dismissal of a librarian and library custodian for having an illegitimate
child).
6. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 99 S. Ct. 2767 (1979) (no independent review of Social
Security distributions); Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel
for indigent defendants in criminal cases when they do not receive a sentence of imprison-
ment); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (upholding exclusion of
drug users, including persons in a supervised methadone treatment program, from all transit
authority employment, including jobs unrelated to the safety of transit authority vehicles
and passengers).
8. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (members of press subject to civil trial
discovery process); Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (press can be
excluded from certain pretrial proceedings); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(press subject to properly issued search warrant).
9. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (no punishment
allowed for publication of truthful information regarding confidential judicial disciplinary
proceedings).
10. For a digest of all of the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court during the
1978-79 Term, see the recent supplement to the author's constitutional law treatise: J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978 with 1979-80 Supp.) [herein-
after cited as NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
11. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
12. C. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
(1946).
13. B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942); see also,
B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (1931).
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outcome of the cases regarding specific groups or values consistently
reflect a particular political philosophy. In these terms, the Warren
Court existed from 1963 to 1969, when a majority of the justices en-
gaged in a distinctly "liberal' voting pattern. 14 The Burger Court took
shape in the mid-1970's, with the emergence of a "libertarian" voting
pattern, not in 1969 when the Chief Justice took office; the 1969-72
Supreme Court represents a transitional Court.
When examining the work of the Supreme Court either to separate
historic and transitional Courts or to evaluate a particular Term, one
must differentiate questions of values from questions of doctrine.
Questions regarding values relate to the substance of decisions (who or
what is protected) and focus on the Court's political philosophy. Ques-
tions of doctrine relate to the way the Court uses its power and whether
the Court employs defensible tests or principles as the basis of its opin-
ions. This differentiation is significant because it is most important to
identify the values which the Court selects for protection in order to
understand and evaluate its position in the governmental.process. On
the other hand, the Court's use of doctrine may be more important
when one questions whether particular justices can justify and protect
the power and role of their historic Court.
Value Selection: Theoretical Framework
The debate over which, if any, values the Supreme Court should
protect from the democratic process predates Marbury v. Madison.15
Commentators have taken three distinct positions in the controversy.
One group of theorists and judges would require the Court to achieve
morally correct results based solely on their conception of morality and
the proper ends of government. 16 Whether or not these persons are
correct, their theories cannot be evaluated in terms of democratic the-
ory because they proceed from an assertion of "good" rather than an
attempt to demonstrate that a particular value has some constitutional
14. See notes 58-66 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of the lib-
eral-libertarian distinction.
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see
generally, J. GOEBEL, I THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971); 1
A.A.L.S. SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Ch. 1 (D. Maggs, ed., 1938); Meigs,
The American Doctrine of Judicial Power and Its Early Origin, 47 AM. L. REV. 683 (1913);
Nelson, Changing Conceptions of JudicialReview: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in
the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972); Grey, Origins ofthe Unwritten Consti-
tution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
16. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978); Wright, Professor
Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REV. 769 (1971).
NEW LIBERTARIAN SUPREME COURTWinter 19801
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
sanction. 17
The second group of commentators and judges argue to exclude
the Supreme Court from any value-oriented judgment; they claim that
the Court can only apply the text of the Constitution in reaching a deci-
sion.' However, it is hard to believe that anyone takes the position
both seriously and nondeceptively. When the Court determines what
"speech" is protected, what the criminal procedure clauses mean, what
process is due, or even when contracts are impaired, the Court neces-
sarily makes value-oriented decisions. We need not elaborate this
point as Professor John Hart Ely has examined in detail the impossibil-
ity of honest reliance on interpretivist doctrine. 9
A third group of theorists confronts the problem of value selection
directly. Robert McCloskey most clearly described a dichotomy in
American thought concerning our democratic process: Americans are
simultaneously dedicated to the theory of representative government
and to the theory that the country must be forced to accept the "right"
choice concerning basic moral/philosophical questions. 20 Examining
this dichotomy and trying to resolve it in terms of court power is a
challenge faced by this group of theorists.
No scholar has faced the problem of defining the Court's role
more honestly than Alexander Bickel, who believed that the Supreme
Court could do little in reviewing the constitutionality of acts of the
democratic branches of government due to the justices' inability to jus-
tify judicial declarations of absolute values for society.21 Bickel sug-
17. For a dissection of such value-oriented theories see Ely, Foreword- On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978). For a clever and insightful discussion of
the problem of judging the rightness or wrongness of systems of morality or value selection,
see Leff, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1977) (reviewing R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS).
18. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). The late Justice Hugo Black was the
principle exponent in the Supreme Court of such a philosophy. See. e.g., Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 60 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
See also Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 467
(1967).
19. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivisnt Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399
(1978); for a rejoinder see Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation", 54
IND. L.J. 277 (1979).
20. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 11, at 12-13, 226-30.
21. For a listing of Bickel's publications see, Writings 0/Alexander A. Bickel, 84 YALE
L.J. 201-4 (1974). The commentary on Bickel's theories and writings is voluminous, but for
helpful analysis of his work the reader should examine: Holland, American Liberals and
Judicial Activism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.i. 1025
(1976); Purcell, Alexander Af Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. Cr. RTs.-
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gested that we turn to a philosophy of consensus based on the political
philosophy of Burke; he believed that only a "computing principle" of
consensus development could define societal values.2" Bickel started
with the belief that the Supreme Court should protect some fundamen-
tal values, but he recognized that it was difficult to reconcile this proc-
ess with the theory of representative government.23 His concern with
the democratic process and the inability of anyone to define absolute
principles led him to assert that the Supreme Court should avoid some
cases because a ruling either for or against legislation would affect the
political process.24 Critics attacked this position as unprincipled, 25 but
it was quite principled in terms of a Burkean philosophy of consensus,
which he later explicitly adopted.26 The Court should interfere with
the democratic process to the least extent possible so that society is free
to arrive at another not immutable consensus.
Not inconsistent with his earlier analysis, in his later years Bickel
found only a limited role for the Court in the governance process as he
doubted whether many fundamental values could be defined properly
by any process other than that of democratic consensus. Bickel at-
tacked the Warren Court for its result-orientation and the attempt of
some justices to impose their personal values on society.27 And in his
last work he argued that neither scholastics nor justices are able to
identify transcendent values for society.28 Those who demanded a
greater role for the Supreme Court in producing a "good" society criti-
cized Bickel, but virtually all such attacks miss the point of Bickel's
career and focus only on the critic's definition of "just" results.29 Bickel
saw the vanity and foolishness of those asserting that a few scholars or
Civ. LiB. L. REv. 521 (1976); Adamany, Book Review, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 271 (reviewing
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT); Coffin, Book Review, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1029 (1976)
(reviewing A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT); Henkin, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1494 (1970) (reviewing A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRESS).
22. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53-54, 87-88, 111, 120-21, 139-42 (1975).
23. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 27-28, 55-65, 129-33 (1962).
24. Id at 111-99. He first expressed this theory in Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
25. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues'"--A Comment on Princile and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
26. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 24.
27. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 98-100, 103-4,
111-13, 177 (1978 Yale ed.).
28. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 23-24, 26, 105-06, 120-21; A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at
4, 96, 175-81.
29. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 16; Barron, The Ambiguiy of Judicial Review: A re-
sponse to Professor Bickel, 1970 DUKE L.L 591.
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judges could determine the "true" set of values that must bind all mem-
bers of society, yet he did not leave the Court without a role in the self-
governance process. Bickel recognized the need for an institution, such
as the Court, to protect some "middle distance" values such as racial
equality or the opening of the political process, but not equalization of
voting power, to all groups.30 He agreed with many of the Court's deci-
sions in the area of criminal and civil procedure in light of the need for
an agency to insure fair treatment of individuals in an adjudicatory
system.3 1 Bickel also saw a role for the Court in protecting First
Amendment rights, primarily, though not solely, because free speech is
the primary tool of consensus development in society.32 He objected,
however, to the Warren Court's attempt to dictate the exact nature and
workings of the political process 33 or the manner in which society
should deal with the problem of ameliorating the effects of past racial
discrimination.34 In those cases the Court went beyond its proper role
of insuring that society be open for consensus development.
Some scholars have argued that consensus analysis need not fore-
close the possibility of a greater role for the Court than that to which
Bickel would have subscribed. If one allows, as Bickel did not, the
justices to determine if governmental acts violate values upon which
there is societal consensus and which have some relationship to the
types of values that did receive protection in the Constitution or its
Amendments, then one finds a role for the Court based on reason and
consensus. The most notable attempt to justify Supreme Court value
selection on a consensus theory is that of then Professor, now Dean,
Wellington, who years earlier had joined with Bickel in an analysis of
the justifiability of judicial policy decisions. Wellington believes that
the Court should not engage in unrestrained value selection but that it
can properly examine the history and traditions of society to determine
whether there is a consensus on a fundamental principle which the jus-
tices should enforce.36 In this way, Wellington and other consensus
theorists37 attempt to bridge the gap between democratic theory and
30. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 25; A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 85, 98-99, 159-60.
31. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 29, 105; A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 32, 54-57, 75-76.
32. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 76-88.
33. A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 35, 37, 108-12, 114, 151, 165.
34. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 33; A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 132-41, 148-51.
35. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957).
36. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47, 265-72, 280, 293, 310-11 (1973).
37. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975); Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
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judicial review.
Professor Ely recently has advanced a position concerning
Supreme Court constitutional decision making and value selection
which he describes as a "representation reinforcing model" for deter-
mining the extent of judicially enforceable principles." Having re-
jected all "morality" and "consensus" theories that justify the judicial
identification and protection of non-textual values,39 he adopted a
model similar to the Carolene Products footnote 440 justification of in-
Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976); Tushnet, The Newer Property
Suggestionfor the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261. For a varia-
tion of consensus theory which sees the Court as a component in a "dialetic of adjudication"
by which consensus is developed, see G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
156, 306 (1978); White, note 300 infra.
38. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REv.
451 (1978). J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) was published as this article went to
press; it includes the Professor's articles referred to in notes 17, 19, 38. The text does not
alter the thesis presented in those articles, but it fixes more precisely the parameters for
judicial review under the representation model. While one hates to sound trite, the text is
properly described as "must reading" for anyone seriously considering the subject of this
article.
39. Ely, note 17 supra. The Professor earlier had rejected the impretivist position; Ely,
note 19 supra.
40. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938):
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370;
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the
right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on re-
straints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 713-14, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v.
Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California,
supra 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378;
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
"Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
484, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited."
This decision was made in the year following the "switch of 37" when the Court disclaimed
any authority to review independently acts of other branches of government under the due
process and equal protection clauses. The footnote offered a tentative framework for the
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dependent judicial review. Ely's thesis, and that of the Carolene Prod-
ucts, is based on the belief that justices should only act: (1) to enforce
textual guarantees of the Constitution, (2) to enforce rights regarding
the political process or (3) to protect discrete and insular minorities
from arbitrary actions and exploitation.4 Professor Ely claims that this
model avoids the value selection and justification problems that Bickel
found insoluble, but it would be unfair to attack Ely for this statement
because he, at one point, admits that these representation principles
involve non-textual values.42 Ely claims that the nature of the constitu-
tional plan of representation and the text of the Constitution and the
Amendments justify these three value determinations. His theory,
whether or not correct, is an attempt to reconcile judicial value selec-
tion with the democratic process by describing a limited set of values
compatible with democratic theory in a way that avoids Bickel's criti-
cism of such attempts. Indeed, a disciple of Bickel would surely attack
any claim of outside validation for each of Ely's principles because they
go far beyond the Burkean system of free societal consensus. First, the
judicial application of "textual provisions" involves selecting values
which may go beyond any that have been validated by the democratic
process. Professor Ely's approval of the decision in Griswold v. Con-
necticut 43 demonstrates that he is susceptible to some value oriented
analysis under the guise of textual interpretation.' Similarly, Ely's tol-
eration of First Amendment rulings that go beyond the interpretativist,
value-free position of Robert Bork45 or the political speech thesis of
Meikeljohn 46 allows for some protection of values that are not demon-
strably based on the history of the First Amendment or the representa-
tional system.47
creation of a new role for Supreme Court constitutional adjudication in the post-1937 world.
For an overview of the relationship of this footnote to the post -1937 decisions see, NOWAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at 404-19.
41. Ely, supra note 38, at 454-56.
42. Ely, supra note 38, at 454 n. 13.
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928
(1973); Ely, supra note 38, at 452 n.7. Ely earlier had rejected interpretivism as "a fake", Ely
supra note 19, at 412.
45. Bork, supra note 18.
46. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245; Meilejohn, On
the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
47. Ely, supra note 38, at 477. As this article went to press, Professor Ely published a
monograph on judicial review which includes a compelling argument for a judicial func-
tion-categorization approach to First Amendment adjudication. See Ely, supra note 38 at
105-16. See also, Ely, infra note 100. For the exposition of theories which justify independ-
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Second, the Constitution does not expressly sanction the protec-
tion of the political process principles so as to demonstrably support
Ely's justification of judicial review in this area.48 In The Supreme
Court and The Idea of Progress, Bickel demonstrated that there was no
basis for choosing majoritarian theories of government over a Madis-
onian factionalism theory.4 9 The Madisonian model for democracy
may be "wrong" because it will not work in a large modem society, but
it is certainly not demonstrably wrong in terms of the history of the
Constitution. It is true that many of our constitutional amendments
relate to regulating the voting process, but that tends to show that the
democratic system is capable of dealing with problems of political ac-
cess rather than establishing a basis for judicial activity beyond en-
forcement of the text. In other words, there is no basis for rejecting
Bickel's view except by an act of faith in a majoritarian-egalitarian
view of the democratic process. Bickel himself claimed that the asser-
tion that the Court was enhancing the democratic process in apportion-
ment and political speech cases was "question begging."5
Third, the "discrete and insular minorities" basis for judiical re-
view presents value selection problems both in terms of identifying the
groups to be protected and the nature of judicial standards for their
protection. Yet it must be admitted that Professor Ely's argument for a
limited judicial role in examining the acts of other branches of govern-
ment on this basis fits his representation model perfectly.
5
'
Professor Ely's analysis is the most important attempt in several
years to deal with the problem of Supreme Court values as it was ana-
lyzed by Alexander Bickel, but not, as Professor Ely suggests in the
ent judicial review under the First Amendment in a manner analogus to representation the-
ory, see Blasi, The Checking Value in First 4mendment Theory, 1977 A.B.E. REs. J. 521;
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979).
48. Bickel, supra note 27.
49. Id at 83, 108-15, 166-67. For an overview of competing theories of democracy and
representation see R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); NoMos X: REP-
RESENTATION (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds., 1968).
50. A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 34-35. Ely bases part of his argument for a representa-
tion model on the demnonstrated concern of our society in the Constitution and especially the
Amendments with representation and process. Ely, supra note 38, at 470-71, 475, 483-85.
No mention is made in this portion of his article of Bickel's challenge to the Warren Court's
placing one view of the political process (majoritarianism) above other possible theories
(such as Madisonian factionalism), but Ely does discuss why he believes the Madisonian
factionalism theory is flawed. Id at 459-63.
51. Ely, Legislative and.4dministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970); Ely, The Constitutionality fReverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv.
723 (1974); Ely, The Centrality and Limits 0/Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1155 (1978); Ely, supra note 38, at ch. 6.
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summation of his argument, because Bickel was wrong in framing the
question in terms of value selection.5 2 Rather, the value of Professor
Ely's thesis is that it may provide a workable standard by which to
judge the Supreme Court's selection of non-textual values for protec-
tion from the democratic process by reference to the democratic process
itself.
Even this brief overview of the competing theories regarding the
legitimate scope of constitutional decision making should suggest why
the Court is unlikely to openly claim a specific role in protecting the
principles of a particular political philosophy. Any such attempt would
have to answer the charges of illegitimacy made by interpretivists, the
demand for justification of choosing among the theories of competing
political philosophies made by those of the Bickel-Ely school, and the
demand for morally correct results made by the new realists. Yet if
these theoretical questions prove too much for the Court, the justices
may well choose to ignore them. That is, justices will tend to follow a
particular political philosophy in their decision making even if they do
not admit that fact in their opinions and even if they are not schooled
in the philosophical background of the positions they adopt. This is
not to say that the rationale of decision making and opinions is not
important, but that evaluation of the Court's work must initially in-
volve identification of the values and political philosophy of the Court.
We must strive to identify each historic Court's value orientation
so that we may evaluate the role of the Court and so that the public
may understand the activities of the Court at a given point in time.
Although constitutional history is unclear and scholars disagree on the
Court's role in value selection, the Court has always protected non-
textual values. Regardless of whether we talk about the Court's activi-
ties in terms of models of adjudication or identification of fundamental
values, we must deal with a continual series of historic Courts, sepa-
rated only by relatively brief transitional periods. Each historic Court
has protected identifiable values:53 the Marshall Court promoted fed-
eralist goals; the Taney Court protected states rights; the post civil-war
Court protected contract rights; the 1890-1936 Court protected both ec-
onomic and personal libertarian values. After 1937 the Supreme Court
entered a fairly long transitional period, perhaps in response to the ad-
verse reaction to it in 1936 and 1937. In the 1940's Chief Justice Stone,
in Carolene Products, advanced a theory for a new framework of value
52. Ely, supra note 17, at 5, 54-55; Ely, supra note 38, at 487.
53. For a complete analysis of Supreme Court activity during these periods see, R. Mc-
CLOSKEY, supra note 11; C. SWISHER, supra note 12; B. WRIGHT, supra note 13.
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selection and Court activity.5 4 During the 1940's and 1950's the Court
became more active in the areas of commerce, criminal procedure, and
racial desegregation, but it only tentatively looked at other personal
liberty questions. In the 1960's the transitional period was over and a
new group of justices had come together to form a majority that ac-
tively employed the Carolene Products rationale." In the 1970's the
justices have continued to engage in extensive value selection.
The Supreme Court as a value selecting political institution is a
historical reality and, for this reason, McCloskey noted that the issue of
the historical legitimacy of judicial review has become virtually an ir-
relevancy. 6 Yet it is important to identify the nature of judicial value
selection to guard against the judicial imposition of the values of a dis-
tinct segment of society on the democratic process and society as a
whole. The membership of the Court at any given point in time varies
quite little in terms of age, economic background, or political philoso-
phy. Scholars have noted, not surprisingly, that the justices hold the
values of the economic upper middle class white males of this coun-
try.57 Indeed, one might ask oneself what the popularly held values of
educated, relatively wealthy professional men between the ages of 55
and 75 were at any given point in our history, and then find that the
answer to that question also identifies the values that the Supreme
Court protected during that period.
In order to identify and evaluate the nature of a historic Supreme
Court we must examine the nature of the rights or groups that tend
consistently to win or lose before the Court. Here it is necessary to go
beyond consideration of the principles and assertions set out in specific
opinions and consider questions regarding the values reflected in the
pattern of Supreme Court decisions. Seen in these terms, I believe that
the Burger Court is actively promoting libertarian values and seriously
opposing the will of justices against the democratic process. But before
turning to an identification of the historic Burger Court we must take a
brief look at the Court to which it is most naturally compared-the
Warren Court.
54. Note 40 supra.
55. John Hart Ely has defined (and defended) the Warren Court as being a Carolene
Products-representation reinforcing Court. Ely, supra note 38, at 451-54.
56. McCloskey, supra note 11, at 16-18. See also, Dixon, The "New" Suubstantive Due
Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 43.
57. McCloskey, supra note 11, at 221-24; Ely, supra note 17, at 37-38. See also, Mc-
Closkey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962
Sup. CT. REV. 34, 46, 60-62.
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Warren Court "Liberalism"
The Warren Court is properly labeled a "liberal" court in terms of
the modem American use of the word liberal. While the correct, or at
least older, use of the word liberal relates to a political philosophy ad-
vocating the greatest possible freedom from government regulation,
since the time of Franklin Roosevelt, the label "liberal" has been ap-
plied to the New Deal variant of earlier Progressive political posi-
tions.58 For our purposes, American liberalism may be said to embody
the goals of: (1) increasing federal power to achieve national police
power/general welfare ends; (2) egalitarianism, including some wealth
redistribution; (3) majoritarianism; (4) regulation of private, as well as
public, entities to protect the previous three goals.
Although no political philosopher espoused a philosophy identical
to the modem American liberal position, Professor Bickel justly
equated the activities of the Warren Court with the philsophy of Rous-
seau.59 Instead of engaging in an open appeal to "natural law" the
Warren Court, like Rousseau, sought to justify its activities in terms of
the social contract,60 and when the democratic process yielded unac-
ceptable (for the Court) results there was an appeal to a "general will"
of the Constitution. In order to update Bickel's point, the Warren
Court's activity and modem American liberalism might be compared
to the philosophy of Ronald Dworkin.61 I would avoid the Dworkin
analogy, however, because many of Dworkin's most cited writings in-
volve commentary on the construct of current legal principles, or con-
stitutional values, rather than offering a complete political
philosophy.62 Rather, I would suggest that the Warren Court's liber-
alism was an attempt to employ a philosophy of rights and duties quite
58.. See, Rotunda, The "Liberal"Label." Roosevelt's Capture of a Symbol, in XVII PUB-
LIC POLICY 377 (J. Montgomery and A. Hirschman, eds. 1968). Professor White contrasts
the differences between Progressive and New Deal political positions with the conffict be-
tween Sociological Jurisprudence and Realists. This contrast yields additional insights into
the "capture" of the liberal label described by Professor Rotunda. G. WHITE, supra note 37,
at 130-35.
59. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 7-9, 120-21. Rousseau's major works (to which Bickel
is referring) may be found in: J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), and Dis-
COURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY (1755) (single volume Pocket Book publication, L.
Crocker, ed. 1967).
60. Professor Ely has defended the Warren Court approach in terms of protecting the
process of constitutional democracy. See notes 38, 40, 41, 55, and accompanying text supra.
61. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
62. The critiques of Dworkin's work are too numerous for a convenient listing here.
However, those interested in an analysis of some of Dworkin's positions in relation to a
theory of rights may find Professor Regan's recent analysis of this subject most helpful. See,
Regan, Glosses on Dworkin.- Rights, Princples, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1213 (1978).
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similar to that of John Rawls.
63
Rawls acknowledges that his attempt to create a political philoso-
phy of duties and rights is largely an elaboration of the social contract
theories of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.' Rawls goes beyond Rous-
seau in developing a theory of general will by hypothesizing a social
compact that is made by persons in an "original position," unaware of
their exact position in society. Rawls most basic provision for his social
compact is that of "justice as fairness." The concept of justice as fair-
ness relates to the fair distribution of goods or services in society as well
as the treatment of individuals by the government. Unfortunately, we
have time and space in this foreward only to restate his core ideas and
related Warren Court decisions. Let us therefore simply repeat John
Rawls' own statement of his theory. Summarizing his basic philosophy
of the compact he states:
[T]he persons in the initial situation would choose two rather dif-
ferent principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that economic ine-
qualities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are
just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and
in particular for the least advantaged members of society. These
principles rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the
hardships of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate. It
may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in
order that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in the
greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of
persons not so fortunate is thereby improved.65
In his "final statement of the two principles of justice for institu-
tions" Rawls summarizes his principles as follows:
First Princole.
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
63. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Later I will suggest that the political phi-
losophy of the Burger Court can best be equated with the libertarian views of Robert
Nozick. See notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text. The finest exposition in "legal liter-
ature" of the views of Rawls and Nozick is Grey, Property andNeed" The Welfare State and
Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 878 (1976). Those readers interested in
seeing how the views of Rawls and Nozick translate into legal arguments for or against a
constitutional right to subsistence welfare payments should compare Michelman, On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1967) (using
Rawls' philosophy to justify claims for minimum wants or needs), with Winter, Povery,
Economic Equality and the Equal Protection Clause 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41 (employing a
Nozick-like philosophy in attacking judicial decisions that have any wealth redistributive
effect).
64. Id at 11, 215, 251. Thus, my thesis about the philosophical basis of the Warren
Court's rulings differs little from that of Alexander Bickel. In fact, Bickel referred to Rawls
as a contractarian with whom he disagreed. A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 4, 100.
65. J. RAWLs, supra note 63, at 14-15.
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total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all.
Second Principle.
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, con-
sistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.6
The Warren Court's constitutional rulings are easily understood in
terms of the Rawls philosophy. Rawlsian principles apply both to gov-
ernment institutions and to society at large; government institutions
should neither approve nor tolerate the existence of private interests
which seek to produce unfairness and inequality beyond the principles
of the social compact." Thus, the Warren Court found that one could
not use any property in public without being subject to the Constitution
and Court selected constitutional values; the Constitution applied to
shops in public office buildings and privately owned shopping centers
as well as to parks.68
66. Id at 302. These two principles are to be interpreted and applied according to two
priority rules and a general conception for the principles:
"First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)
The principles ofjustice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty
can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.
There are two cases:
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty
shared by all;
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser
liberty.
Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency
and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior
to the difference principle. There are two cases:
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those
with the lesser opportunity;
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of
those baring this hardship.
General Conception
All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal dis-
tribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored."
Id at 302-3.
67. Rawls requires a structure of social institutions which will produce fairness and just
distributions in society. Id at 10, 54-56, 275-77. He does not establish a system to guide
individual decision making or moral choice, although he offers some guidelines for individ-
ual action. Id at 54-6, 61, 63, 108-17.
68. The reference is to the state action rulings of the Warren Court. See, e.g., Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping centers),
overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(park); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (official discriminatory encouragement
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The Warren Court's view of the social compact called for an in-
crease in federal power because smaller governmental units could not
be allowed to thwart the goals of fairness and equality. The Court in-
creased federal judicial power in matters of civil liberties, "incorporat-
ing" the Bill of Rights6 9 and extending jurisdictional concepts. 70
Similarly, the justices had little difficulty upholding federal civil rights
legislation regardless of whether it governed the actions of private per-
sons or state entities.7 ' This position on federal power carried over to
the approval of federal regulation of economic activities of state gov-
voiding trespass conviction); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(private coffee shop in government owned building). For an analysis of the Warren Court
and Burger Court state action rulings in terms of a balancing of competing values, see Glen-
non & Nowak, 4 Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Require-
ment, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221. For an overview of all the state action decisions see NOWAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at ch. 14.
69. The Court had incorporated the basic principles of the Fourth and Eighth Amend-
ments into the concept of liberty prior to the 1960's, but it did not settle the question of
whether those principles applied to the states in the same manner as to the federal govern-
ment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth Amendment, but not exclusionary
rule, applicable to the states); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(cruel and unusual punishment clause applied to states). The Court had applied the provi-
sions of the First Amendment to the states prior to the 1950's. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, supra note 10, at 414-15. The modern process of incorporation of the criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights began with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied to states) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963) (Fourth Amendment standards identical for federal and state cases).
In the 1960's and early 1970's the Court incorporated all of the Bill of Rights provisions
related to criminal procedure except for the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment,
whose incorporation has been rejected since 1884. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
A basic list of the other incorporation cases is as follows:
Ffth Amendment-Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel); Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (self-incrimination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination).
Sixth Amendment-Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartial
jury); in re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).
Eighth Amendment--Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (assuming application
of excessive bail provision to state cases); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel
and unusual punishment clause); Louisiana exrel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(cruel and unusual punishment clause).
70. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (mootness); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968) (standing); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (injunction of
state proceedings); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (ripeness).
71. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964).
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ernments which were unrelated to civil rights.7 2
The justice as fairness principle was central to the Warren Court's
rulings on the nature of due process protection to be accorded an indi-
vidual in both civil73 and criminal proceedings.74 This principle was
carried over into the area of equal protection, as the Warren Court
created a hard line dichotomy between types of legislation which it
would review strictly and legislation which it would virtually rubber
stamp. The Court was committed to insuring the type of equality
which Rawls regarded as a critical part of the social compact. Those
equality concerns involved eliminating racial discrimination in public
institutions or public activities, implementing majoritarianism, and en-
suring that individuals were treated fairly in the distribution of govern-
mental benefits.
In its suspect classification analysis, the Warren Court's only con-
cern was with discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.
Indeed the Court pursued the goal of eliminating racial classifications
in cases going beyond its equal protection decisions.7" Many decisions
which facially dealt with state action, First Amendment rights and fed-
eral jurisdiction in fact were designed to insure that those persons sup-
porting racial integration would win the dispute that was the focus of
the litigation.76 Significantly, the Warren Court did not use the suspect
classification analysis except in its examination of racial classifications.
It did nothing to protect against discrimination based on alienage77 or
72. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities v.
.Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (restrictions on wage
garnishments); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (fair administrative decision
maker); Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile court proceedings).
74. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (prisoner access to courts); Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at sentencing); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) (equal protection right to counsel in first appeal). See cases incorporating the Bill
of Rights provisions cited in note 69 supra. See generally Nowak, Foreword-Due Process
Aethodology In The Postincorporation World, 70 J. CgiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1979).
75. As to the prohibition of racial classifications, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state action); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (free speech);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (free speech and assembly). Significantly,
one major decision of the Warren Court that upheld a conviction of civil rights demonstra-
tors involved a refusal by the demonstrators to honor a court order. Walker v. Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967). See note 93 infra.
77. The Burger Court, during its transition period, first found alienage classifications to
be suspect in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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gender." At the close of the Warren Court era the justices placed some
limits on the ability of government to use classifications in the defini-
tion of wrongful death actions based on legitimacy of birth,7 9 but they
did not have a chance to explain whether they would actively seek to
end the use of such classifications in other settings.
The fundamental rights strand of the Warren Court equal protec-
tion decisions also conformed to Rawlsian philosophy and modem
American liberalism. Rawls considered the principle of one per-
son-one vote to be the basis of any just constitutional system. 0 The
Warren Court reflected this philosophy; its mathematical approach to
one person-one vote problems8' was an attempt to give control of the
political process to judges who would be more sympathetic to the goals
of the original compact and who were beyond the influence of special
economic interests that might influence legislative apportionment.
The Warren Court's other fundamental rights decisions, while not
earth shaking, also related to a modem liberal philosophy. In Griswold
v. Connecticut, 2 the Court held that the government must refrain from
interfering with certain aspects of a traditional marriage. The decision,
although more "libertarian" than "liberal" in our terminology, was not
a great break from traditional views of rights in family relationships.
8 3
The right to travel decisions of the Warren Court involve very limited
rulings designed to implement Rawls' philosophy. The Warren Court
78. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding exemption of females from jury duty
unless they request to serve), overruled in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
79. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
80. J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 222-24. Rawls also approved the allowance of private
economic interests to influence political parties. Id at 225-26. However he only indirectly
attacked the concept of weighted voting even though he demanded a one person one vote
rule. Id at 232-34, 247.
81. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (freedom of choice in private education). Justice Harlan had made a strong argu-
ment for Court recognition of rights in the marital relationship in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Griswold asserted a rela-
tionship between the right protected in the case and provisions of the Bill of Rights, but four
of the seven justices voting in the majority rested their position on assertion of rights in a
marriage relationship that were not related to the text of the Constitution or its amendments.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by War-
ren, C.J., and Brennan, J.); Id at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is possible to see Griswold
as a limited holding concerning rights society traditionally has recognized in marriage and
which have some arguable relationship to the text of the Bill of Rights. See Ely, supra note
44.
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was not concerned with restrictions on travel 4 but with the problem of
distributing goods and services to newly arrived residents of a state. As
a result, the Court showed little concern with the right to international
travel; 5 it simply did not care about the concept of freedom of move-
ment for itself but only as it related to equality in society. Thus, the
concept proved useful when the Court required an equal distribution of
goods and services to new residents; 6 recent relocation was irrelevant
to a just distribution of those items under a Rawlsian approach to
equality in holdings.
In its criminal procedure decisions, the Court employed the Bill of
Rights provisions, due process and equal protection to guarantee uni-
form treatment of economically deprived persons through the use of
federal power.8 7 The exclusionary rules were designed to prevent the
abuse of the rights of economically disadvantaged persons.88 The Sixth
Amendment rulings regarding right to appointed counsel, 9 and the
equal protection decisions regarding the provision of transcripts90 and
counsel 9' on appeal, all relate to the liberal, Rawlsian conception of the
tolerable degree of inequality between members of society.
The free speech decisions of the Warren Court are best to under-
stand as a reflection of Rawlsian philosophy and modem American lib-
eralism. The Court's most famous and innovative decisions promoted
Rawls' position92 that the social compact must promote equality and
must allow for free speech on social issues. At first glance, the many
cases dealing with picketing and public speech appear to manifest the
Court's concern with an intrinsic value of self-expression and fulfill-
ment of one's personality through public expression, but virtually all of
84. The Court, however, did help to protect true travel rights as it upheld the applica-
tion of the Civil Rights Act conspiracy provisions to persons who conspired to impede travel
by black persons. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Of course, the fact that the
decision favored the cause of racial equality makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to
which the Court was concerned with a right to travel.
85. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (prohibition of travel to Cuba upheld).
86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
87. See cases cited in notes 69 and 74, supra, and note 91, infra.
88. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); But f, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Nowak, supra note 74.
89. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
90. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
91. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961) (appellate court filing fees must be waived for indigent defendants); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959).
92. See J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 226.
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the Warren Court decisions concerning picketing involve demonstra-
tors protesting alleged acts of racial segregation by public and private
entities. With very few exceptions93 the Court protected these demon-
strators.94
The Warren Court also sought equality of input into the so-
cial-political process. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,95 the Court's most fa-
mous and significant decision in the area of political speech, the Court
protected Ku Klux Klan members' free speech rights. But Branden-
burg established a standard for the punishment of advocacy that would
be difficult to meet when government sought to punish other unpopular
views.96 The Court also opened the process of self-governance to com-
peting ideas by restricting the ability of government to punish political
beliefs in the denial of government employment or licenses.9 7 The
Warren Court's defamation rulings protected the press from the abu-
sive use of the judicial process by politically powerful groups and thus
aided unpopular political causes.98
Apart from the equality-political process cases, the Warren Court
did little to protect free expression. In United States v. O'Brien,99 Chief
Justice Warren quite willingly applied a balancing test, in a fairly loose
manner, to punish the symbolic speech of young men who protested the
war in Vietnam by burning their draft cards. This ruling is, of course,
antithetical to Rawls' philosophy of liberty in the political process, 1°°
93. The two notable exceptions are Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (disre-
garding injunction of court with jurisdiction) and Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(protest on jail grounds).
94. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
95. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
96. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). It is difficult to analyze the rela-
tionship between Brandenburg and the promotion of "liberal" goals by the Warren Court
because the decision came at the end of the Warren Court era.
97. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). But see Koningsberg v. State Bar of California,
366 U.S. 36 (1961).
98. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (decided together with
Associated Press v. Walker); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
99. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
100. Rawls' positions on civil disobedience and conscientious objection to the applica-
tion of laws appears to favor the position of the young men, although this is less than clear.
See J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 361, 368, 374, 378-93. Those passages make it clear that
Rawls would not approve of the ease with which the Court found a sufficient "content-
neutral" basis for punishing these young men, given the realities of political debate during
this time. Professor John Hart Ely, a former clerk for Chief Justice Warren, has done as
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but one should remember that the Vietnam war was in large part an
enterprise undertaken by "liberal" administrations and not as uni-
formly condemned in 1968 as it was in the 1970's, once society had
more opportunity to observe the conduct of the war.
The Warren Court's lack of concern with the value of self-expres-
sion was evidenced in a variety of ways. The Warren Court did not
create a strict test for determining what type of speech could be pun-
ished as "obscene." In the area of obscenity, the Warren Court never
issued a majority opinion following its holding that obscenity was not
protected by the First Amendment.'' A majority of the Warren Court
justices always held that obscenity was "unprotected" but they never
agreed on the need for a national standard10 2 or on the degree of value
that would make an arguably obscene work non-punishable. 103 The
Court did approve prior restraints in obscenity censorship systems, 1' 4
albeit with some restrictions. 10 5 Economic self-expression or "commer-
cial speech" was entirely unprotected by the Warren Court;10 6 this lack
of protection is not surprising because government regulation of com-
mercial speech constitutes, in the liberal's view, a governmental at-
tempt to curtail exploitation of the populace by commercial interests.
Just as the Warren Court had little concern for a true right of
self-expression, it had little concern for principles of religious freedom.
The Warren Court did not demand the separation of church and state
much as possible to legitimize the Warren opinion in O'Brien. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorizing and Balancing in First Amendment Anasis, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975). However, it is not the O'Brien standard which violates the
Rawls principles of liberty and fairness but the manner in which Warren accepted the gov-
ernment's assertion of a legitimate basis for punishing the protesters.
101. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). By 1967 the Court gave up the attempt
to formulate standards and simply denied certiorari when it agreed with the punishment of
an obscene publication, and issued a per curiam reversal of any con% iction for distributing
materials that five or more justices felt were not obscene. See Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967). The Court did agree to punish particularly offensive (in the Court's view)
publishers in Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), and Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502 (1966), and those who sold obscene material to children in Ginsburg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
102. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199-201 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
103. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
104. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
105. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965).
106. The Court did protect an advertisement in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), but this was an ad soliciting support for a group challenging racial discrimina-
tion.
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in its parochial school'017 or Sunday closing law decisions.' Despite
adverse public reaction, the Court's excursions into the area of religious
freedom in striking down the use of a religious oath, 10 9 school
prayers,1'0 a prohibition of the teaching of evolution" 1 and religiously
discriminatory unemployment compensation laws" 2 represent limited
rulings on rather clear principles.
Surprisingly, the Warren Court did not engage in a great deal of
activity in terms of selecting a wide variety of areas for judicial review.
Instead, the Warren Court concentrated its work on four general con-
cerns: (1) racial desegregation, (2) criminal procedure, (3) reapportion-
ment-political process problems and (4) free speech issues related to
desegregation and the political process. Indeed, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether the Warren Court helped to shape the 1950's and 60's or
whether it merely reflected the mood of the populace during that pe-
riod. Despite disputes over the specific means of implementing the de-
segregation cases (and the possibility of finding desegregation
violations in the North), the majority of the country clearly agreed with
the Court in eliminating active, governmentally enforced racial segre-
gation." 3 The scope of the Court's criminal procedure decisions has
been the subject of great debate, but the goal of ending the "third de-
gree" and insuring a fair criminal process no longer seems seriously
disputed. In the area of reapportionment, the Court may or may not
have been justified in its actions on a theoretical basis but the emerging
political importance of cities and suburbs provided a ready basis sup-
port for the Court's rulings. In short, the Warren Court does not seem
to have challenged the country during the 1960's on a great number of
issues; instead, it sought to promote the values of liberal political phi-
losophy through a variety of decisions that were not totally out of step
with popular thought.
107. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
108. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
109. Torcaso v. Watkins; 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
110. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
111. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
112. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
113. Bickel believed that the presidential campaign of 1960 gave popular validation to
the Court's desegregation principle, if not its chosen manner of implementing that principle.
A. BICKEL, supra note 27, at 93.
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Burger Court "Libertarianism"
At first glance it might appear that the Court now is engaged in
undirected activism, simultaneously striking federal and state laws in
areas never considered by the Warren Court and limiting Warren
Court rulings that restricted governmental power. But closer examina-
tion of the Court's constitutional rulings in recent Terms will show that
the Burger Court, at least since its transition period ended in 1973 or
1974, represents a historic Court which is dedicated to the promotion of
a libertarian political philosophy.1 14 When I refer to a "libertarian"
philosophy I mean to identify a political philosophy which places free-
dom of the individual above values of egalitarianism or fairness. In
such a philosophic system no governmental interference with the lib-
erty of any individual, group of individuals, or economic entity can be
justified except by the necessity to insure the respect for human life or
property rights. This philosophy is often attributed to John Stuart Mill.
Such attribution is correct regarding individual freedom" 5 but is incor-
rect insofar as one attempts to relate Mill's view of personal liberty to
the economic system." 6
The modem libertarian philosophy applies to both economic and
non-economic liberty and has its roots in the position of the economist-
114. At the 1980 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, after the
completion of this article, I presented the basic thesis of this portion of the article at the
Constitutional Law Section meeting. At the plenary session of the annual meeting, Profes-
sor William Van Alstyne, my friend and one-time colleague, presented a quite similar analy-
sis of the political philosophy of the Burger Court. While these positions were
independently arrived at, they are mutually supportive, and the reader should consult Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne's article to get a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the
rulings of the Burger Court, the political philosophy of John Locke and modern libertarian
political philosophy. See Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence ofProper/r Rights as the Foremost
Principle of Civil Liberties.- The First Decade of the Burger Court, - Law & Contemporary
Problems - (1980). This upcoming issue of Law & Contemporary Problems will also con-
tain commentary on the Burger Court by: John Frank, Ernest Gelihorn, Paul Gewirtz,
Thomas Grey, A.E. Dick Howard, Paul Mishkin, Henry Monaghan and Terrance
Sandalow. See also, Choper, The Burger Court. Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint
andInsensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 767 (1979): Dixon, supra note 56.
Professor Grey's previous examination of "liberal" and "libertarian" political philosophies
should be examined by anyone seriously considering this subject. See Grey, supra note 63.
115. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
116. Professor Dworkin has a helpful analysis of the Mill's range of application of his
liberalism. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 258-65. Dworkin states that Mill was a "socialist"
who would not apply liberalism to economic exchanges. Id at 264-65. It might be more
precise to say that Mill would have preferred a world in which free economic exchange
would not produce harmful effects to a discrete class of individuals and that he was ready to
accept a government-regulated economy to avoid those harmful effects. See J.S. MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, BOOKS II, V (1848) (Colonial Press ed. 1900).
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jurisprudent Adam Smith.'17 Today the position is often called "con-
servativism" and associated with economists as often as philoso-
phers."18  In order to avoid confusion regarding the nature of
libertarian philosophy, I would refer to Robert Nozick, I I9 the best
known critic of John Rawls and modem advocate of libertarian philos-
ophy. My thesis is that the actions of the Burger Court are best under-
stood as a reflection of modem American libertarianism as espoused by
Robert Nozick. Thus, the Court's rulings should not be evaluated
merely as reactions of varying intensity to aspects of Warren Court de-
cisions but, rather, the advancement of a new set of non-textual values
by a new historic, libertarian Court.
As our touchstone for analysis of the Burger Court's rulings, let us
use Nozick's own summary of the libertarian position:
Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal
state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force,
death, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that
any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be
forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the mini-
mal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implica-
tions are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the
purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to pro-
hibit activities to people for their own good or protection.120
The Burger Court has not broken any new ground when consider-
ing cases concerning the compatibility of state actions with the dormant
commerce clause,' 2 ' but it has broken with tradition by placing a severe
117. See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776) (Modem Lib. ed. 1937); A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Oxford
ed. 1978). See also E. GINZBERG, THE HOUSE OF ADAM SMITH (1934); Stein, Adam Smith's
Jurisprudence-Between Morality and Economics, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (1979).
The view may in some measure be traced to the political philosophy of John Locke,
whose views of the economic implications of government acts were not as sophisticated as
those of Smith but who built a more complete philosophy of government upon a conception
of the inter-relationship of property rights and liberty. See J. Locke, Second Treatise of
Government (1690) in J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Mentor ed. 1960). It is
possible to equate the Burger Court's rulings on property rights with Locke's conception of
property ownership and rights. See Van Alstyne, supra note 114; see also Nozick, supra
note 119.
118. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM (1962); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
119. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
120. Id at &x.
121. The Court has taken a strict view of the permissible scope of state regulation of
economic activity that creates market inefficiency by restricting the flow of commerce or
commercial entities. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976). However, the Court has upheld "police power" regulations designed to promote
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restriction on the commerce power of the federal government. In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery22 the Court held that the commerce
power did not extend to certain activities of state governments; its rul-
ing was based more on Tenth Amendment principles than upon an ex-
amination of the proper scope of the federal commerce power. 123 The
majority opinion, by Justice Rehnquist, found that the Tenth Amend-
ment demonstrated that there was some limitation upon the sovereign
functions of the state. Unfortunately, the majority gave no explanation
of how one was to differentiate the sovereign functions of a state from a
state's private sector activities, which could be governed by all federal
commercial regulations. Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote in a 5-4 deci-
sion, believed that the decision was based on a judicial balancing of
federal and state interests,' 24 an interesting opinion if only because of
his total failure to justify a judicial power to independently evaluate
practical economic concerns. The pre-1937 libertarian Court defended
states' rights on the basis that each state had a guaranteed role as sover-
eign in the federal system and that this guarantee relegated certain ar-
eas of possible regulation of the activities of their citizens to state and
local governments. The National League of Cities defense of states'
rights is weaker than the pre-1937 position since it is based only on an
economic analysis of the burdens placed on state governments. Yet the
Burger Court found this sufficient to overrule a Warren Court deci-
sion, 25 perhaps because this "principle" is clearly related to an Ameri-
can conservative variant of libertarianism: the power of the federal
government should be severely limited and the states left free to act in
their own sphere in so far as possible.' 2 6 The Burger Court has indi-
safety or economic welfare locally which did not seriously burden interstate commerce. See
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Court seems to be employing a balancing test in this area. See
Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v.. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). While the Burger Court may be
more oriented toward free markets than any court since 1937, the Supreme Court through-
out its history has independently reviewed state laws under the dormant commerce clause.
See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at ch. 9 (1978).
122. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
123. Although the majority opinion reads as-if it would conclude with a ruling that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited application of the federal minimum wage law to state and
local governments, the opinion concluded that such application was "not within the author-
ity granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3." Id at 852. Apparently the ruling was designed to
leave the Burger Court free to determine whether it should set different restrictions on other
federal powers that might affect state government. Id. at n.17.
124. Id at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
126. The desire to limit the powers of the federal government relates to a popular Ameri-
can "conservative" form of libertarianism. However, Nozick describes utopia as a frame-
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cated that it will allow the federal government to regulate states, in
derogation of otherwise existing Eleventh and Tenth Amendment prin-
ciples, if the regulation is passed pursuant to Congress' power under
the Civil War Amendments. 27 But, like the post-Civil War Supreme
Court that sought to restrict the legislative powers of Congress in the
civil rights area with Tenth Amendment principles, 28 this Court may
yet rule that it will give Congress little deference in deciding what types
of regulations may be deemed properly within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, section 5 power of Congress.
The Burger Court has restricted the jurisdiction of federal courts
in a variety of cases related to civil rights matters,129 although the Court
has not significantly restricted the ability of Congress to create causes
of action with broad grants of standing. 130 It is interesting to note that
the Court has created implied causes of action based on racial and gen-
work system that would allow small communities to establish their own forms of
governance. See R. NozICK, supra note 119, at 311-12, 320, 329, 332. Professors
Michelman and Tribe have argued that a future Supreme Court could use the National
League of Cities decision to require states to'give subsistence welfare benefits (thus creating
a Rawlsian World), but these articles, while brilliantly written, seem no more than an exer-
cise in wishful thinking. Yet they may be useful to a future historic "liberal" Supreme Court
which seeks to overturn the intended effect of the majority opinion. See, Michelman, States'
Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of State "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and .ffirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065
(1977).
127. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See also Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
128. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8 (1883). See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra
note 10, at 454.
129. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973). The Court, however, has indicated that it will use the Eleventh Amend-
ment to restrict the ability of Congress to create causes of action against state governments
which are enforceable in federal courts unless Congress uses its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to create a cause of action. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See generally Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower
to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1975); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmuni-
ties in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1978). Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressionallmposition 0/Suit Upon
the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978). The Burger Court has limited the power of
Congress over state and local governments by its analysis of the Tenth Amendment and the
commerce power. See notes 122-26 supra.
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der discrimination. 13 These particular actions did not involve claims
against the government that would result in redistribution of income,
and the rulings may reflect libertarian philosophy by allowing chal-
lenges to affirmative action programs and to constraints on economic
liberty based on gender distinctions.
The state action decisions of the Burger Court clearly reflect liber-
tarian philosophy. 132 The issue in such cases is whether the actions of
nominally private parties should be subject to constitutional restraints;
a libertarian court must cut back the basis of state action in order to
leave private actors free from governmental, constitutional regulation.
Robert Nozick seems to doubt that company towns should be subjected
to constitutional claims; 33 he argues that one person cannot acquire
rights in property of others merely by having been allowed to use it.
The libertarian Burger Court has reduced government regulation and
limitation of property rights by leaving broadcasters free to refuse edi-
torial advertising, 34 private clubs free to discriminate by race, 35 pri-
vate utilities free to turn off a customer's power, 136 shopping center
owners free to exclude picketers and speakers from their property,' 37
and creditors free to engage in self-help. 38 At the start of its 1979
Term the Court agreed to hear a claim that the California Supreme
Court had violated the property rights of a shopping center owner by
131. Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979) (implied cause of action under due process
clause of Fifth Amendment against congressman alleged to have made gender-biased em-
ployment decisions); In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979), the Court
implied a private civil cause of action from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
against educational institutions receiving federal funds alleged to have discriminated in their
admissions on the basis of race. In so doing, the Court indicated that it would find an
implied private cause of action against federally funded institutions that discriminated on
the basis of race under Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts (42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq). That Title
VI issue had been left open in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
The Burger Court, during its transitional period, also implied a cause of action against
federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment rights of private persons. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court has not stepped back from that
ruling although it has limited the nature of privacy interests that are protected by the Fourth
Amendment; the Court's view of privacy does correspond with a libertarian-property rights
philosophy. See Nowak, supra note 74, at 413-18.
132. For an examination of how the use of different value systems has affected Warren
Court and Burger Court state action rulings, see Glennon & Nowak, supra note 68.
133. R. NozicK, supra note 119, at 269-70.
134. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
135. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
136. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
137. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
138. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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interpreting the California Constitution so as to allow persons to enter
a shopping center to solicit signatures on a petition to government. 139
The Burger Court's libertarian philosophy also can be seen in its
rulings concerning procedural due process. 140 In 1972 the Court told us
that some interests of an individual are neither "life" nor "liberty" nor
"property" and, therefore, can be deprived by the government for any,
or no, reason and with no procedural safeguards. The transitional
Court of 1970 had appeared ready to follow the call of Professor Reich
to find a right of fair treatment in the distribution of government dis-
tributed benefits. 4 In Goldberg v. Kelly, 142 the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, cited Reich and stated: "It may be
realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property'
than a 'gratuity.' "143 However, during the 1970's, the Burger Court has
rejected the Reich conception of an entitlement to welfare benefits and
used the term entitlement as it is employed by Robert Nozick or other
libertarians. According to Nozick a person is entitled to something
only if he has reduced it to his possession by his labor, or received it
from another person who owned the property interest. 44 Thus, the
Burger Court has found that an individual is entitled to the fruits of his
labor and no more; he or she will be entitled to fair treatment in the
allocation of government distributed benefits only if the other branches
of government, within their discretion, choose to give the individual
139. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, cer. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3319 (1979) (No. 79-289).
140. For a complete analysis of the distinction between procedural and substantive due
process, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at 380-83, 476-517 (1978).
141. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Wefare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965). Professor Van Al-
styne then developed a theory of fair treatment of individuals by government agencies by
demonstrating the artificiality of attempts to divide rights worthy of due process protection
and the role of judges in fashioning a principle of freedom from arbitrary procedures. Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property'" Adjudicative Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
142. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
143. Id at 262 n.8. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Id at
271 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 282 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
144. R. NOZICK, supra note 119, at 150-53, 160. The only restraint on ownership is that
a person cannot hold or use property in a manner that makes it impossible for others to
maintain a "base line position" (Le. there may be something wrong with capturing the only
oasis in a desert and depriving one's neighbors of water). Id at 177-78, 180-81.
Nozick notes that his conception of property rights is built upon that of John Locke. Id
at 175. For an examination of the views of Locke on property rights and the rulings of the
Burger Court, see Van Alstyne, supra notes 114, 117.
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such a right by declaring them entitled to the benefit.'45
Even when the Burger Court has found that a government act de-
prives someone of life, liberty, or property, it has not created any strin-
gent procedural requirements to guard against arbitrary deprivations.
The Court has adopted only a balancing test; it weighs the requested
procedure's value in avoiding an erroneous factual determination
against the cost to both the government and society from increased ad-
ministrative complexities.' 46 Professor Mashaw examined this balanc-
ing test in detail and argued convincingly that, in using it, the Court
has failed to consider the due process values of "fairness, individual
dignity, and equality."' 47 This failure is not surprising because recent
Supreme Court cases have involved interests which the Burger Court is
not seriously interested in protecting. Thus, school children may have
a right to an informal hearing before they are dismissed from school for
disciplinary reasons, 14 but failure to give the student a hearing will
cost the government nothing unless it has deprived the student of a
property interest at the same time.1 4 9 In the last Term, the Burger
Court considered several procedural due process issues. The Court im-
posed serious restrictions on the ability to commit adults to mental in-
stitutions; 150 this ruling fits the pattern because freedom of physical
restraint is one of the few libertarian rights. But there was no signifi-
cant restriction on the ability of parents to commit their children to
mental institutions; 151 children do not have recognized rights until they
reach a stage of maturity that separates them from parental control.'
52
Using a pragmatic balancing approach the Court gave some, but not
great, protection to those charged with receiving overpayments of wel-
145. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (no right of attorney to appearpro hoc
vice in a state where he has not been admitted to the bar); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976) (government employment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (government employment). Cf Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) (minimal procedural protection for loss of disability welfare benefits to
which persons have previously been entitled).
146. The balancing test was explicitly adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
147. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'r Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge. Three Factors In Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. Rv. 28
(1976). See also Saphire, Speciy'ing Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1978).
148. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
149. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The Court has also held that a
post-secondary school need not provide formal hearings for those who are dismissed for
academic failures. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
150. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
151. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutional-
ized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
152. R. NoziCK, supra note 119, at 38, 287-89, 330.
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fare benefits, 53 or who were dismissed from a licensed profession.
154
Of course, the Burger Court found no interest worthy of due process
safeguards in the claims of prisoners who were being considered for
parole. 5 5 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority, stated: "That
the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a
mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. . . a hope which is not
protected by due process."
156
At this point one might question why the Burger Court would re-
strict the criminal procedure rulings of the Warren Court, if individual
freedom is the basis of libertarian philosophy? The answer is quite
simple: in a libertarian philosophy, the state's existence is justified by
the need to prevent aggression against individuals and to enforce con-
tract and property rights.1 57 A true libertarian court would provide for
the punishment of crimes of aggression without using procedures that
have wealth redistributive effects. Its emphasis would be on efficient
fact determination with little concern for the effect on low income
groups; it would avoid ruilngs that provide "free" benefits or proce-
dures to defendants. The recent criminal procedure rulings of the Bur-
ger Court fit the libertarian mold:1 58 the Court has limited Miranda v.
Adrizona 159 to its facts;161 it has limited the basis for challenging police
153. Califano v. Yamasaki, 99 S. Ct. 2545 (1979) (interpretation of Social Security Act
requirements).
154. Barry v. Barchi, 99 S. Ct. 2642 (1979) (post termination process sufficient for suspen-
sion of race horse trainer); cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979) (90 days suspension
of drivers license for failure to take intoxication test upheld when the state provided a post-
suspension hearing to the driver).
155. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100
(1979).
156. Id. at 2105. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (minimal protection regarding
conditions of imprisonment).
157. R. NozICK, supra note 119, at iv, 23, 33.
158. See Nowak, Foreword-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World,
70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 397 (1979).
159. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
160. The Burger Court has not excluded any testimonial evidence solely on the basis of a
Miranda violation during the 1970's. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 Sup. CT. Rnv. 99, 100-01. During the past Term, the Justices were evenly divided on
the issue of whether evidence gained as the result of a Miranda violation could serve as a
basis for establishing probable cause for a search. Massachusetts v. White, 99 S. Ct. 712
(1979) (per curiam). The Court, however, excluded testimony which was gained from a
defendant outside of the presence of his attorney after the initiation of formal proceedings
and a police agreement with the attorneys to refrain from such questions. Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). This 5-4 decision may only reflect on strong belief in the adver-
sary nature of the pre-trial and trial processes. See, Nowak, supra note 158 at 412-13.
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda. What is "Interrogation"? When Does it
Maier?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978).
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practices connected to identification procedures; 61 it has avoided
Fourth Amendment issues by finding that several types of government
activities which produced evidence do not involve a search or other
constitutionally cognizable invasion of privacy.' 62 The Burger Court
drastically moved away from the Warren Court concern with equality
and the right to counsel when it held that an indigent is not entitled to
state-paid counsel at a criminal trial if he is not to be incarcerated,'63
not even if he is faced with a complicated charge which he cannot fairly
defend against without an attorney. The libertarian cast of all such
decisions is clear, but their compatability with due process values is not
because the Burger Court has issued its libertarian decisions in opin-
ions that purport to be no more than technical interpretations of Bill of
Rights provisions.'64
When dealing with substantive due process and equal protection
the Burger Court, to date, has forsaken meaningful review of "eco-
nomic and social welfare" legislation.165 This position seems inconsis-
tent with the libertarian model but two important qualifications must
be noted. First, the Burger Court has retained some control over eco-
nomic legislation. It has limited the federal commerce power insofar as
it relates to state governments, 66 and it has engaged in active review of
state economic legislation under the commerce clause. 167 Indeed, the
Burger Court has gone further than any post-1937 Supreme Court in
controlling economic legislation by its use of the contract clause 68 and
its development of new commercial speech principles. 169 Second, any
indication of an independent judicial role in reviewing economic legis-
lation under the due process and equal protection guarantees would
make it difficult for the Court to refuse to review the fairness of social
161. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
162. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979) (no "search" when pen register
device placed a telephone line to record numbers dialed from phone); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) (no standing to challenge search of car by one with no ownership interest
therein).
163. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
164. See Nowak, note 158 supra.
165. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), overruling Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957).
166. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
167. See note 121 supra.
168. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannas, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)- U.S. Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). It is noteworthy that the justices are now having difficulty deter-
mining the judicial role in reviewing property use restrictions under the takings clause. See
Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
169. See notes 283-95 and accompanying text, infra.
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welfare legislation. In other words, forsaking review in this area costs a
libertarian court little for the political process is unlikely to produce
highly inefficient economic regulations or wealth redistributive legisla-
tion which cannot be examined under the contract or commerce clauses
and it gives the Burger Court a ready excuse for its refusal to review
claims of rights in the distribution of welfare benefits. Nevertheless,
the Burger Court's decision to review the California Supreme Court's
finding, under the California Constitution, that persons had a right to
go on to a privately owned shopping center to solicit signatures on a
petition to the government 170 may indicate that the Supreme Court is
willing to take the final step back to the pre-1937 libertarian Court's
model of ad hoc rulings protecting property rights. 171
The Court's refusal to find that the impact of legislation on a spe-
cific group is sufficient to prove an invidious legislative classification
allows it to relegate many laws to the area of nonreviewable "economic
and social welfare" legislation, 72 an area containing wealth classifica-
tions and welfare distributions. Libertarian philosophy maintains that
wealth disparities created by differences in earnings, inheritance, or
chance are not wrong; there is no moral claim for redistribution of
those benefits. Nozick emphasizes the libertarian belief that govern-
ment should not attempt to redistribute wealth or income by asserting
that taxing a person to benefit others is identical to enslaving him to
work for the people the taxes benefit. 173 The Burger Court consistently
refuses to review classifications in welfare laws that neither touch upon
fundamental rights nor employ classifications based on race, national
origin, alienage, illegitimacy or gender. 74 A truly libertarian Supreme
170. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3319 (1979) (No. 79-289, Nov. 11, 1979). It is possible
that the Supreme Court could decide the Robins case on jurisdictional or First Amendment
grounds and avoid the due process-property rights issue.
171. The Supreme Court allowed the NLRB to require business property owners to al-
low some organized labor activities on their property in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556
(1978). A Supreme Court ruling overturning the California decision would have to be based
on a Burger Court determination of the extent of interference it would allow with property
rights based on its assessment of the importance of the government regulation. The 1979-80
Term has already given us two rulings on the nature of government activities that constitute
compensable "takings" under the Fifth Amendment which appear to rest on adhoc views of
the worth of property rights. Compare, Andrus v. Allard, 100 U.S. 318 (1979), with Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
172. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979); New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 430 U.S 568 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
173. R. NozICK, supra note 119, at 169, 170, 172, 230-31, 268.
174. See Califano v. Boles, 99 S. Ct. 2767 (1979); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181
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Court would interpret specific provisions of the Constitution so as to
avoid any wealth redistribution that is not absolutely necessary to the
application of those provisions in its decisions. The Burger Court has
found that while an. individual defendant has a Sixth Amendment right
to have retained counsel at a misdemeanor trial which does not result
in incarceration, or to prepare papers for discretionary review, an indi-
gent has no right to have counsel provided in those situations. 175 Indi-
gents have a right to appointed counsel for trials that result in their
imprisonment, but states may be able to recoup the costs of counsel
provided those indigents. 76 Women have a right to purchase abor-
tions, but indigent women have no right to state-paid abortions. 177
The most protected fundamental right in the Burger Court years
has been a woman's right to an abortion. 178 Last Term the Court con-
tinued to defend this right for all women who could not be determined
to be so young and immature that they could not make a decision accu-
rately assessing their own self-interest. 7 9 The abortion decisions are
most interesting because they involve the Court in openly selecting
non-textual values to protect; the early decisions concerning a right to
make private child rearing decisions come from the pre-1937 liberta-
rian Court.'8 °  This certainly is a libertarian position; libertarian
philosophers find no worth in forcing someone to control their actions
so long as those actions do not hurt another, separate person.'8 To a
(1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979);
Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 939 (1972) (per curiam).
175. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel when trial does
not result in sentence of imprisonment); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to
counsel in preparing papers for discretionary review process).
176. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
177. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). These cases dealt only with the refusal to fund discretionary
abortions; the Court has not yet determined whether the state may refuse to fund medically
necessary abortions but it may resolve that issue during the 1979-80 Term. See Williams v.
Zbaraz, Quern v. Zbaraz, United States v. Zbaraz, jurisdiction noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3356
(1979).
178. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
179. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
180. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). See also note 83 supra.
181. It is the concept of the separate existence of individual persons that causes a liberta-
rian to support restrictions on individual actions which cause physical harm to other per-
sons. See R. NOZICK, supra note 119, at 33. It is interesting to note that this position
corresponds to the Court's concept of "viability" as a limit on the right to an abortion. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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libertarian economist the abortion regulations are only means of in-
creasing the price of abortions beyond the market clearing price; the
laws cause some doctors to charge not only for their services but for the
risk of criminal prosecution.18 2 The Burger Court, as we have noted,
took a libertarian position when it refused to require government fund-
ing for the abortions of indigent women; the libertarian "right" is the
ability to secure services without a claim upon the resources of others.
The Burger Court has not been true to libertarian philosophy in
other "right to privacy" decisions. It has overturned all of the laws
relating to the sale of contraceptives" 3 and, thereby, freed the market
for such products of artificial government constraints. But the Court
has not established any right to engage in sexual activity, except by
lawfully married couples. During the Court's transitional period it ap-
peared that the justices might find some constitutionally protected free-
dom regarding the sexual relations between consenting adults, 184 but
that possibility apparently has been rejected by the Burger Court.
While the Court has not issued an opinion dealing with a claim of right
to engage in consensual sexual activity by adults in private, several of
its rulings make it clear that a majority of the justices believe that there
is no right to engage in such activity. A majority of the justices have
stated that they believe that minor children have no right to engage in
sexual activity that is outlawed by the state, even though minors may
have a right to buy contraceptives. I 5 The justices have summarily af-
182. See, e.g., D. NORTH & R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 8-14 (2d ed.
1973). This point corresponds with the Court's protection of doctors from criminal prosecu-
tion for all abortions except those performed on a fetus so clearly viable that the act virtually
would constitute the killing of an infant. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
183. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertising of contracep-
tives, sale to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (sale to unmarried adults);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Warren Court ruling regarding use of contra-
ceptives by married couples). There has been no questioning of the early decision overturn-
ing statutes punishing certain criminal activity with involuntary sterilization. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (equal protection decision regarding classifications for steril-
ization).
184. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court ruled that it was a violation of
equal protection to punish unmarried persons for purchasing items that would prevent dis-
ease or pregnancy because there was no clear proof that a ban of such purchases in fact
would deter persons from committing illegal sexual acts. The Eisenstadt majority opinion
by Mr. Justice Brennan described the right to privacy as a right to be "free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child." Id at 453.
185. In Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court invalidated a
law which allowed only pharmacists to sell non-medical contraceptive devices to persons
over 16 years of age and prohibited the sale of such items to persons under 16. As to the
general restriction, there was a majority opinion that the burden on an adult's freedom of
choice could only be justified by a compelling interest and that distribution only through
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firmed convictions for private homosexual conduct8 6 and refused to
consider the firing of government employees for illegal homosexual 8
7
and heterosexual' 8 activity. What can be the explanation for these rul-
ings? A good libertarian would find that consenting adults have a right
to engage in any mutually acceptable activities as long as they do not
harm another person; there can be no distinction based on whether the
activity is heterosexual or homosexual, done for mutual pleasure for for
the financial profit of one party.18 9 Perhaps the problem here is that
libertarian values in this area simply have proven too much for the
Burger Court. The Court has accepted only what we might term an
"American conservative variant" of libertarian political philosophy.
This selective blending of libertarian philosophy and personal conser-
vatism would not separate the Burger Court from the pre-1937 liberta-
rian Court. It must be remembered that during the 1900-1937 period
the justices approved about as many restrictions on economic freedom
as they rejected. They often were persuaded that -a particular type of
economic regulation was necessary for the protection of a specific po-
pharmacists did not advance such an end. The Court struck the restriction on children with-
out a majority opinion. Writing for four members of the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan im-
plied that even young persons have some rights to freedom of choice in these matters. Two
Justices voted to uphold the restriction on sale to minors. Id at 702 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing); id at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The other three Justices voting to strike the law
wanted to avoid any implication of a right of minors to engage in sexual activity. They
would allow prohibition of sexual activity, including use of the contraceptives by minors.
But, as there has never been any evidence that denial of contraceptives to young persons
deterred them from such activities, for the state to require them to assume greater risks of
pregnancy and disease if they violated the law was so arbitrary as to violate due process. Id
at 702-03 (White, J.); id at 707-08 (Powell, J.); id at 713-16 (Stevens, J.). When these three
Justices are combined with the two dissenting Justices, there appears to be a majority that
would allow statutes strictly regulating the sexual activity of minors.
186. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), af'fg mem., 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three judge court). See also Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
Cf Enslin v. Bean, 436 U.S. 912 (1978) (denial of certiorari).
187. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1978); Cf Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d
1337 (1976), petition denied, 74 N.J. 251, 377 A.2d 658 (1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 879
(1978).
188. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), a f'd
mem 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 734 (1978) (Justice Marshall dis-
sented to the denial of certiorari and wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Brennan noted his
dissent).
189. For an examination of the philosophic basis of right to privacy decisions and the
problem of applying them so as to approve these results, see Richards, UnnaturalActs and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1977);
Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 469; See also Rich-
ards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A MoralArumentfor Decriminalization
of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1979).
[Vol. 7:263
Winter 1980] NEW LIBERTARIAN SUPREME COURT
lice power interest which they felt was more important than the concept
of economic liberty. Robert McCloskey, after examining the Supreme
Court's treatment of some tax and commerce cases during the pre-1937
period, noted:
As so often in the cases of this era, the Court had been un-
able to develop an objective formula that would distinguish be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable departures from the free
enterprise ideal. By their ultimate resort to subjectivism, the
judges kept their hands on the reins and retained their freedom of
discretion. But they made it harder to convince observers that
judicial review was more than another step in the legislative
process. 190
A generalized, substantive right to privacy has never been champi-
oned by the Supreme Court as it was not a major concern of the liberal
Warren Court and it runs against the conservative variant of libertari-
anism employed by the Burger Court. Thus, the Burger Court avoided
declaring that an individual had a right to control his or her body when
it gave women the right to have an abortion.' 91 The Court's recent
statutory ruling concerning the distribution of laetrile, 192 leads one to
believe that the Court is not likely to endorse such a right in the near
future. 93
Marriage may be a fundamental right for the Burger Court, but it
will not require any greater amount of wealth redistribution on the part
of the government than is necessary to protect this right. The Court has
found that the state must waive filing fees for a divorce where the par-
ties cannot afford to pay the fee, 194 and that the right to marry cannot
be denied a person for failure to pay his or her previously ordered ali-
mony or child support payments.195 But the Court will allow the gov-
emnent to employ marriage classifications to distribute welfare
benefits so long as the classifications are not also based on gender or
legitimacy. 196 The conservative variant of the libertarian position
shows itself in the opinions of justices who would hold that direct re-
strictions on the right to engage in a traditional, heterosexual marriage
190. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 11, at 144.
191. "In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amic that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize
an unlimited right of this kind in the past." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
192. United States v. Rutherford, 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
193. For an overview of the arguments for and against a "right to die", see NOWAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, 1979-80 Supp. at 131-32.
194. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
195. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
196. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Cf. Califano v. Boles, 99 S. Ct. 2767 (1979).
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will be independently reviewed while traditional restrictions on mar-
riage, relating to age and sex, will be deemed within the police power of
the state. 19
7
The Burger Court also has taken a libertarian position on the right
to interstate travel. Judicial review of residence requirements for wel-
fare programs is inconsistent with the philosophy that would reduce or
eliminate government attempts to redistribute wealth.' 98 The Court
did strike down a one year residency requirement for medical care at
public expense; the state need not choose to provide such services but it
may not provide them in a way that disfavors those indigent persons
who have recently changed their residence to that state.' 99 The Burger
Court, however, has done no more than strike down significant barriers
to residence changes. The Court has upheld differing tuitions at state
universities for in-state and out-of-state residents,20° a one year resi-
dence requirement for divorce, 20 ' and a requirement of continued resi-
dence in a city for public employment z.20  The'justices also have
indicated that the right to travel is not affected by a cut off of welfare
benefits for leaving a jurisdiction.0 3
The voting rights rulings of the Burger Court reflect a libertarian
view of the political system rather than the majoritarian view of the
Warren Court. The Burger Court has struck down those restrictions on
voters or candidates which restrain the political market. It has invali-
dated residency requirements that were not reasonably related to the
efficient operation of primary2" and general elections, 205 the applica-
tion of filing fee requirements to candidates who could not afford to
197. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396-97 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); id at
395 (Stewart, J., concurring).
198. See Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup.
CT. REV. 41 (arguing that Warren Court review of residency requirements for welfare was
an inefficient and unjustifiable attempt to redistribute wealth).
199. Memorial Hospital v, Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
200. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aft'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
Stans was cited with approval in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452-53 n.9 (1973), wherein
the Court invalidated an unreasonable definition of state residency for tuition purposes as
an "irrebutable presumption" because it precluded a person from becoming a resident of the
state for in-state tuition purposes for several years.
201. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
202. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
203. See Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
204. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (striking a 23 month limitation on
party switching) with Rosario v. Rockfeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding an 11 month
party registration requirement).
205. Compare Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) and Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686
(1973) with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See also O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524 (1974).
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pay the fee,206 demonstration of support requirements designed to bar
challengers and independent political parties, 207 and judicial interfer-
ence with party nominating conventions. 20 8 Yet, the Burger Court has
gone no further in promoting egalitarian goals than was absolutely nec-
essary to protect the concept of voter and candidate liberty. The Court
narrowly recognized the ability of the government to publicly fund the
presidential campaigns, but it simultaneously held that the First
Amendment would not tolerate an attempt to equalize citizen voices
regarding political campaigns-a clear rejection of the Rawlsian phi-
losophy of equality.209 Similarly, the Burger Court found that corpora-
tions have a First Amendment right to advertise to influence public
referenda,210 although it has left open the question of placing special
limits on corporate spending in partisan elections.2 1'
The rejection of egalitarian, majoritarian theories of democracy is
also evidenced by the Burger Court's rulings on one person, one vote
issues. The Burger Court has upheld the use of super majority require-
ments for referenda, 212 the use of multi-member voting districts (so
long as they are not racially gerrymandered), 2 3 and the limitation of
voting for members of specialized, regulatory agencies to directly af-
fected groups. 214 The Burger Court has enforced the one person, one
vote principle with strictness only when it has examined congressional
districting;215 it has dramatically loosened the reins controlling district-
ing possibilities for state and local governments. 216 What unites these
decisions is the libertarian view of the political process in which each
individual or corporation is free to act, spend, or vote in a manner
206. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
207. Compare Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979), with American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 779-88 (1974) and Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
208. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). See also O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1
(1972).
209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The "liberal" Rawls position requires a guar-
antee of equality in political participation including speech activities. See note 92 and ac-
companying text, supra.
210. First Nat'1 Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
211. Id at 788 n.26.
212. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S.
259 - (1977); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 259 (1971).
213. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (upholding multi-member district plan);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (striking plan based on racial discrimination). Cf.
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
214. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Associated
Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973).
215. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
216. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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which suits his preferences and abilities. The government must not
equalize opportunities for political participation and it need not give
persons a guaranteed voice in decisions merely because the decisions
affect those persons. Robert Nozick made this point by asking: "Does
Thidwick, the Big-Hearted Moose, have to abide by the vote of all of
the animals living in his antlers that he not go across the lake to an area
in which food is more plentiful?" ' 7 The Burger Court answered "no"
to this question in Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa,218 as the Court held
that residents in an unincorporated area, which was partially governed
by the City of Tuscaloosa, were not entitled to vote in the Tuscaloosa
elections.
The group protection as well as fundamental rights decisions of
the Burger Court reflect a libertarian philosophy. In reviewing gender
classifications the Court has adopted the "substantial relationship to an
important government interest" standard to invalidate all gender classi-
fications that the justices consider unreasonable.2 19 The Court may al-
low some compensation of women as a class for past discrimination,2 0
but it will strike any gender based system of welfare payments which
the justices do not find closely related to that end.22 ' As a libertarian
Court it upholds liberty by limiting governmental restrictions on the
private sector or private relationships. It will not allow the government
to place differing restrictions on the liberty of men or women regarding
economic freedom or family rights.222 Professor Ely has noted that
these gender classification decisions cannot be justified by a Carolene
Products or representation analysis since the Burger Court is not seek-
ing to identify a discrete, insular minority whose interests would not be
217. R. NoziCK, supra note 119, at 269. Nozick's reference, which he cites in his foot-
notes, is to DR. SEuss, THIDWICK, THE BIG HEARTED MOOSE (1948). Nozick makes this
point to demonstrate both the lack of a justifiable guarantee for persons to have a voice in
decisions that affect them, and the problem of finding legal constraints on the actions of
private persons because their use of property affects others. See notes 132, 133 supra.
218. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
219. On v. On, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
220. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Cf.
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
221. Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
222. Regarding economic freedom see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (ability to
purchase alcoholic beverages); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (ability to be estate admin-
istrator). Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (eligibility to serve on jury). Regard-
ing family rights see On v. On, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7 (1975) (child's eligibility for parental support payments). Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979) (overbroad distinction between adoption "veto" rights of male and female
parents of illegitimates).
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represented in the democratic process.2 2 3 These Burger Court rulings
have saved men from unfavorable treatment as often as women; the
cases seem to be a rejection of Muller,224 not Lochner.225 But, like the
pre-1937 Court, the Burger Court may permit some classifications with
an adverse effect on one gender (usually women) if it believes those
classifications are related to some police power-general welfare interest
which it considers more important than sexual equality.226
The Court echoed libertarian philosophy when it ruled, regarding
government treatment of illegitimates, that "imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil-
ity or wrongdoing. 227 In other words, the Court is more concerned
with anti-libertarian punishment of illegitimates rather than equal op-
portunity for illegitimate children.228 Thus, the Burger Court has re-
fused to impose serious constraints upon the freedom of government to
assume that most males wish to leave their property to their legitimate
children by upholding a state restriction of inheritance from fathers to
legitimate children and illegitimates who have received a judicial order
of paternity during the father's lifetime.229 It is noteworthy that the
Court has found it easier to deal with some apparent illegitimacy cases
in terms of sexual discrimination rather than discrimination against il-
legitimates."3
223. Ely, supra note 19, at 12.
224. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding "protective" legislation limiting
the maximum hours of work for women).
225. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hour law applica-
ble to male workers).
226. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (upholding veterans' prefer-
ence in civil service system despite impact on women). Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (employment restriction on pregnant teachers is invalid ir-
rebutable presumption) with Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of maternity
benefits from state operated insurance system upheld). Regarding the selective invalidation
of statutes by the pre-1937 Court, compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (restriction
on women's hours of work upheld) with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(minimum wage law for women workers invalid).
227. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
228. The Burger Court has only invalidated illegitimacy classifications that apparently
punished the illegitimate. See Jemenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
229. Lalli v. Laffi, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). This decision virtually eliminated the impact of
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), wherein the Court held that a state could not
exclude all illegitimates from inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession.
230. The Court used the gender discrimination standard to overturn a state law which
gave "veto" rights over the adoption of illegitimate children to all mothers but no fathers of
such children. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). The Court upheld the limitation
of a father's ability to sue for the wrongful death of an illegitimate child to those fathers who
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Classifications based on United States citizenship present severe
problems for a libertarian court. Resident aliens who have not sought
United States citizenship have by their own act, or failure to act, within
the terms set by Congress for naturalization, chosen not to be a part of
the body politic, but it makes no sense to restrict their actions in the
private sector if they have been lawfully admitted into the country.
During its transitional period the Court ruled that alienage classifica-
tions were "suspect,"23' but, as the Burger Court's libertarian philoso-
phy matured, the justices have been less concerned with the fair
treatment of resident aliens. The Burger Court will restrict a state's
ability to classify by United States citizenship in basic welfare bene-
fits, 232 or in private sector employment, 233 but it will not interfere with
the dispensation of the government benefit of public employment.234
Because the federal government has significant interests in the conduct
of foreign relations as well as welfare distribution, the Court will toler-
ate almost any alienage classification used by the federal govern-
ment.235
There are not enough decisions concerning racial equality to re-
solve the question of how the Burger Court will treat this principle. So
far the Court has not questioned the Warren Court prohibition of ra-
cial classifications which burden members of a minority race. But there
was serious division among the justices last Term when deciding
whether to allow habeas corpus challenges to the racial composition of
had legally established their paternity before the child's death. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347 (1979). Mothers of an illegitimate must be given the ability to sue for the wrongful
death of their child as if the child were legitimate. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
231. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). For an overview of the Supreme
Court's treatment of alienage classifications prior to the 1970's, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, supra note 10, at 589-96.
232. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (educational benefits), Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (subsistence welfare benefits).
233. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (attorneys). States may restrict the
employment of illegal aliens, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
234. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (limitation of employment as teachers in
public schools to citizens upheld); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (limitation of state
police positions to citizens upheld). The state must make a determination of its need to
exclude aliens from specific types of public employment so as to insure that there is a gov-
ernmental interest in the exclusion. Thus, states may not simply exclude all aliens from all
civil service positions. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
235. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976) (civil service commission lacks statutory basis for exclusion of aliens from
federal civil service although Congress might be able to enact such a blanket exclusion).
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grand juries,236 and how to implement school desegregation princi-
ples.237
The difference between a liberal and a libertarian court should be
apparent in rulings on affirmative action programs designed to aid
members of minority races, but the Burger Court has yet to issue a
constitutional ruling concerning such programs. 238 In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,239 four of the five justices who
reached the constitutional issue would have upheld reasonable affirma-
tive action programs that were designed to assist members of minority
races without using absolute quotas or stigmatizing members of a ma-
jority race, but three of these four justices were holdovers from the
Warren Court.2' The four who voted to apply literally the Title VI
prohibition of racial criteria may or may not have a libertarian opposi-
tion to redistributive programs.24 Justice Powell's deciding vote was
truly libertarian in that he refused to allow government supported insti-
tutions to have strict categorizations of persons by their race rather
than their individual merit, while allowing educational institutions
freedom of choice in admissions.242 Powell's position might help or
hurt members of minority races; it is concerned with academic freedom
not desegregation. In United Steel Workers ofAmerica v. Weber,243 the
Court had little difficulty with upholding an affirmative action agree-
ment made as a part of the bargaining process between a union and a
private employer; liberals favor the end result of the bargain and liber-
236. Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S. Ct. 2993 (1979).
237. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
238. For a more complete analysis of these rulings see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG,
supra note 10, 1979-80 Supp. at 84-103. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the
Supreme Court's treatment of racial classifications and issues during the Warren Court and
Burger Court years, see J. WILKINSON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM BROWN TO BAKKE
(1979). For a most insightful comment on the relationship between the interests of racial
minorities and Supreme Court rulings, see Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Inter-
est-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
239. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
240. Id at 355-62 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & White, J.J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
241. Id at 421 (Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, J.J., & Burger, C.J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
242. Id at 287-305, 311-20 (Powell, J.). For a detailed analysis of the Powell opinion
and the Bakke ruling, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10; Blasi, Bakke as
Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 21 (1979); Dixon,
Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CALIF. L. Rnv. 69 (1979); Karst & Horowitz, The
Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. Civ. RTS.-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 7
(1979).
243. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
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tarians do not want to interfere with the private bargaining process.
We must await future cases to determine if the Burger Court will take a
libertarian stand against the ability of government to deal with the
problems of racial minorities by affirmative action and wealth redistri-
bution.2'
The Burger Court's rulings concerning the freedom of religion
have reflected libertarian philosophy in a rather uneven manner. The
Court has interpreted the establishment clause so as to virtually elimi-
nate any possible form of meaningful aid to parochial schools.24 5
These cases eliminate the conservative-libertarian endorsed proposals
for a tuition voucher system,246 but this is explainable on two bases.
First, the justices have given no indication that they realize that their
rulings may have the effect of nationalizing education by disadvantag-
ing all private sector school systems.247 Second, the justices have split
into three groups concerning this issue with the most liberal justices
seeking to end aid to parochial schools, the more libertarian justices
favoring the tuition voucher plan, and the justices casting the decisive
votes reflecting no discernible philosophy in these cases.248
244. The Court may make that determination this Term, as it has heard arguments re-
garding the constitutionality of the federal "set aside" of public works funds for businesses
owned by members of a racial minority. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979) (No. 78-1007).
245. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975). Aid to religiously affiliated colleges has not been so restricted, see Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). For an examination of all of the Supreme Court's
rulings in this area see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at 851-68. In the 1979-
80 Term the Court upheld a state program of reimbursing private schools for grading stan-
dardized state examinations and for reporting data about the student, faculty and schools to
the state. However, the court did not alter the standards used in previous cases nor did it
expand the scope of permissible state aid to religious schools. Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 100 S. Ct. 418 (1979).
246. The voucher system was first suggested in A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
736-38 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (n.p. 1776). The concept was more fully developed by Professor
Friedman. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 118, at 85-107.
247. By offering education subsidies only "in kind" to those persons choosing the public
schools, the government drastically reduces the ability of private schools to exist, much less
prosper, because of the limitation on the number of persons willing to pay the market price
for education. For a more complete analysis of the effect of these decisions see Nowak, The
Supreme Court, The Religion Clauses, and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U. L.
REv. 883 (1976).
248. The division of the justices in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), provides an
excellent example of this relationship. There, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall
voted to overrule Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding textbook pro-
gram), and to allow no aid to parochial schools or their students. Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Stewart upheld the textbook program but would allow no more aid to parochial schools
than had been approved by previous decisions. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
would uphold neutral aid in the form of secular goods and services if they were provided
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The Court has been quite receptive to free exercise claims; this is
consonant with the libertarian desire to limit the ability of government
to control individual freedom. The Burger Court has found that some
religious groups can withdraw their children from all formalized edu-
cation,2 49 that members of all sects, and their ministers, must be al-
lowed to participate in the electoral process, 250 and that religious
disputes can only be resolved by civil courts if the courts can avoid
questioning religious beliefs.25'
In the area of free speech there has been less difference between
the Warren Court and the Burger Court than in the other areas we
have examined. The libertarian principle of individual freedom, when
)applied to the problems of government restraints on speech, is quite
close to the liberal value of free expression regarding self-governance
issues.252 Thus, the Burger Court has protected individuals who alter
the slogans the government inscribes on automobile license plates, 253 or
who refuse to pay for union dues which can be used to further positions
on social matters with which the individual disagrees. 4 Similarly, the
Court denied government the ability to hire or fire its employees on the
basis of their political beliefs25 5 or speech.256 The libertarian justifica-
directly to the students. The one exception to this apparent relationship is Justice White,
who would uphold a wider variety of programs than would Chief Justice Burger or Justice
Rehnquist. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
813 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). However, if Justice White is an exception, he shows con-
sistency in his position on educational issues. He has perceived the effect of limiting the
educational opportunities of low-income children and he consistently votes to increase those
opportunities. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63
(1973) (White, J., dissenting). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting to holding that teachers were not subject to constitutional limitations
on their use of corporal punishment for students); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ma-
jority opinion by Justice White on student disciplinary hearings).
Justice Douglas was replaced by Justice Stevens, who has voted with Justices Brennan
and Marshall to eliminate virtually all aid to religious institutions, see Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
250. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
251. Compare Jones v. Wolf, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979), with Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979).
252. We examined some of the Warren Court free speech rulings at notes 93-106, and
accompanying text supra. For an exposition of a libertarian belief in free speech, see J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 11 (lst ed. London 1859). For a thoughtful analysis of Mill's position
and competing theories, see Wellington, supra note 47.
253. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
254. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
255. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
256. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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tion for the existence of a state is the need to prevent violent, criminal
behavior; it is not surprising that some members of a libertarian court
may hesitate when applying the concepts of vagueness or overbreadth
to "criminal" conduct.25 7 Nevertheless the Burger Court has continued
to use the Brandenburg test for determining what type of advocacy may
be made illegal25 and it has applied vagueness and overbreadth princ-
ples with strictness in all areas259 except those relating to political cam-
paign acts of government employees260 and commercial speech.2 61
While one hears a great deal about the Burger Court's restrictive
attitude towards obscene publications, its position on the constitutional
status of obscenity is, in functional terms, no different than that of the
Warren Court.262 Given the Burger Court's requirement that the judge
independently screen a trial record to determine whether or not a rea-
sonable jury could find the challenged material to be obscene,263 there
is very little difference between the adhoc Warren Court obscenity rul-
ings and the fact oriented prurient interest, offensive to community
standards, and lack of serious value tests used by the Burger Court.264
The Burger Court has allowed the government to regulate some
sexually oriented speech that is not obscene. In Young v. American
257. Some justices have voiced objections to using these tests to void convictions for
"unprotected" criminal activity. See Lewis v. New Orleans (Lewis II), 415 U.S. 130, 136
(1974) (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518, 528, 534 (1972) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
258. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
259. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Lewis v. New Orleans
(Lewis II), 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Eaton v. Tulsa, 415
U.S. 697 (1974); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). The Burger Court has
had difficulty in examining the extent to which governmental units may restrict speech activ-
ities in areas "owned" by the government. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (restric-
tions on campaigning and leafleting on military base upheld), Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (restrictions on advertising accepted by public bus line upheld).
Professor Van Alstyne has found that these decisions may be reconciled with other civil
liberties decisions of the Burger Court by the fact that they reflect a Lockean view of prop-
erty rights. See Van Alstyne, supra note 114.
260. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
261. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462-63 n.20 (1978).
262. See notes 101-05 and accompanying text supra, regarding the rulings of the Warren
Court.
263. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). The Supreme Court will not allow judges
or justices to include children in the "community" whose standards are used in the test. See
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978).
264. This test was adopted by the Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For
an examination of the current tests, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 10, at
838-47. There is at least an arguable basis for asserting that the new tests have had no effect
on the local regulation of "obscenity." Note, An Empirical Inquiry Into the Effects of Miller
v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 810 (1977).
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Mini-Theaters, Inc. 265 the Court upheld restrictive zoning of adult the-
aters and, in FCC v. Pacjica Foundation,266 it upheld FCC regulations
regarding the times in which certain sexually oriented material could
be broadcast. In each of these cases Justice Stevens wrote a plurality
opinion that employed analysis similar to the balancing test used in the
1940's and 1950's by Justice Frankfurter.267 But Stevens was unable to
gather a majority for his view. The decisive votes turned on the princi-
ple that the government could seek to avoid certain effects of these
speech activities: the reduction in the value of property near the thea-
ters,268 and the exposure of children to the offending broadcasts.269
While the results in these cases may not be perfect in terms of liberta-
rian political philosophy, they come close: restrictive speech "zoning"
is impermissible unless the government can prove a demonstrable con-
nection to the overriding ends of protecting property and children.
In dealing with the problems of the communications media, the
Burger Court's libertarian philosophy has been evidenced in a variety
of ways. The Court has allowed the electronic media, despite its status
as a regulated industry, freedom of choice to reject editorial advertis-
ing,270 and it has precluded the regulation of the content of newspapers
265. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
266. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
267. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52, 70-72 (1976) (Stevens,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., White and Rehnquist, JJ.); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 743, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.). The Stevens
opinions reflect his view that the content of speech can be regulated when the regulation is
unrelated to the suppression of ideas and is closely related to the achievement of important
governmental interests. This balancing of the worth of the speech and loss of First Amend-
ment value caused by the restriction, against the nature of the governmental interest and the
relationship of the regulation to that interest, was the essence of the Frankfurter balancing
approach. Frankfurter's concurring opinion in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), is particu-
larly close to the Stevens plurality opinions. For other examples of the Frankfurter ap-
proach, see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Those who favor this test would do well to remember that it led Justice Frankfurter to
approve forcing children of the Jehovah Witness faith to salute the American flag. Miners-
ville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (majority opinion by Frankfurter, J.), over-
ruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). While the
Stevens balancing approach offers little in the way of a principled definition of First Amend-
ment freedom, it has served as the basis for Professor Farber's recent exposition of a more
honest approach to content regulations. See Farber, Content Regulation and The First
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980).
268. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
269. FCC v. Pacifiea Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761-62 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., concurring).
270. C.B.S. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Court has upheld FCC
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for the purpose of giving persons a right to use newspaper space for
replies to newspaper editorials.27 The Court has prohibited the pun-
ishment of the press for the printing of truthful information272 because
everyone should have the liberty to repeat truthful information, absent
some compelling, state-justifying reason for the particular punishment
or prior restraint. In a true libertarian spirit, the Burger Court has
treated the press as any other business. Thus, the press had no special
protection from grand jury subpoenas, 2 73 the, execution of search war-
rants,z7 or civil discovery.2 75 Becasue the Burger Court is unwilling to
fashion an institutional role for the press in the democratic process, it
will declare no special right of the press to gain access to government
documents, 276 programs, 277 or pretrial proceedings.27-
The defamation rulings of the Burger Court are also consonant
with this libertarian view of the press. The Court has attempted to
fashion constitutional rules to protect the press from being punished for
criticizing public officials and public figures while finding nothing
wrong with making the press pay for the damage it does to the reputa-
tion of a private individual.279 In other words, the press must assume
responsibility for its own actions, but not political reprisals.2 80 The
regulations regarding the broadcast of "offensive" material. See notes 265-67 supra. For an
analysis of the constitutional problems of judicial, legislative, or executive regulation of a
communications medium, see Van Alstyne, The Mu bius Stri of The First Amendment: Per-
spectives on Red Lion, 29 So. CAR. L. REv. 539 (1978).
271. Miami Herald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
272. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979); Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977) (per curiam); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
273. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
274. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
275. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
276. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (no right to reproduce
Watergate tapes).
277. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (no special right of access to jails); Pel
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
278. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
279. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S.
245 (1974).
280. The public figure or public official must still prove "malice" as well as "falsity" to
recover for defamation. A private person must prove negligence by the media to recover
actual damages, and malice to recover preserved or punitive damages. See note 279 supra.
The Court has refrained from determining what, if any, restrictions the First Amendment
places on the ability of states to allow a civil recovery of damages from a private individual
(non-media) defendant for defamation by a private individual plaintiff. As there is less
need to protect against punishment of the media in such cases, it is possible that the Court
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Court's libertarian philosophy is also evident in its definition of the
class of public figures whose reputations may be injured without realis-
tic hope of compensation; there must be individual responsibility or
voluntariness found in the acts which are asserted as the basis of the
public figure status.2 ' Similarly, the libertarian Burger Court refused
to allow the press to take a performer's business from him by showing
videotapes of his act when the performer had attempted to develop a
business of private performances.282
The key to understanding the Burger Court's protection of speech
connected to economic activity appears in Buckley v. Valeo.283 In that
case the Court upheld restrictions on the amount of money that could
be contributed to candidates for political office as a necessary means of
stopping subtle forms of bribery. But it invalidated, as a violation of
the free speech clause, limitations on the campaign spending of the can-
didates or other individuals promoting the candidacy of another per-
son. These limitations were based on Congressional adoption of a
philosophy like that of Rawls, which required equalized political voices
to protect the principles of the social compact.28 4 The Burger Court
held that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .. ."I" It was but a short
step to the decision holding that economic entities have First Amend-
ment rights; if government cannot equalize the disparity in individual
abilities to promote a message, it cannot limit the speech of entities
which represent groups of individuals who have pooled their resources
in a corporation. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,286 the
Court found that corporations and other economic entities could not be
restricted in their spending regarding public issues, whether or not the
corporation had some pecuniary interest in the issues. 287 These rulings
are perfectly consistent with libertarian philosophy: they remove gov-
would allow plaintiffs in those actions to recover actual damages on a strict liability basis or
punitive damages on a standard less strict than the malice standard. However, the Court has
noted that it has not resolved this issue. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 n.16
(1979).
281. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
282. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
283. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
284. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
285. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
286. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
287. The Court left open the possibility that it would allow some limitation of spending
by economic groups relative to partisan campaigns for public office. 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26.
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emiment restraints on individual liberty and prohibit the Rawls redis-
tributive-egalitarian approach to political speech.
The Court has carried this libertarian philosophy into the area of
so-called "commercial speech," '288 but here it had to overturn the com-
mercial speech exception from First Amendment protection which had
been created by earlier Courts to allow the government to regulate
those advertising practices which a regulatory agency might consider to
be contrary to the public good. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,289 the Court rejected the com-
mercial speech exception from First Amendment protection and over-
turned a governmental prohibition of truthful price advertising by
pharmacists. The majority opinion reads like a primary libertarian ec-
onomics text; it based its holding on the assertion that it was an im-
proper, "paternalistic" governmental act.290 According to the Burger
Court the restriction on commercial information raised transaction
costs in a manner antithetical to First Amendment freedom.2 9' Given
the libertarian notion of freedom in the marketplace, there appeared to
be no restriction of commercial speech beyond the prohibition of de-
monstrably false or misleading advertising that would be upheld by
this libertarian Court. Thus, the Court invalidated restrictions on the
placing of for sale signs 92 and the prohibition of advertising of lawful
products or services. 293 It sustained the prohibition of in-person solici-
tation of clients by attorneys only if there were factors to indicate that
288. For three excellent but conflicting views of the basis for, and justifiability of, the
Burger Court's commercial speech rulings, see Farber, Commercial Speech andFirst Amend-
ment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372 (1979); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Eco-
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. Rv. 1 (1979); Rotunda, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080).
289. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
290. "[O]n close inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in
large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance. The advertising ban does
not directly affect professional standards one way or the other. It affects them only through
the reactions it is assumed people will have to the free flow of drug price information.
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative
is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication rather than to close them." Id at 769-70.
291. The opinion explains at length that the advertising ban will not produce efficient,
high quality pharmacy services but only increase costs by restricting the flow of information
(thereby raising transaction costs) and reducing price competition. Id at 762-70.
292. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
293. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertising sale of contra-
ceptives); Bates v. State Bar of Ohio, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising attorney price and
service information).
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the attorney was acting in a misleading manner.294 However, during
the past Term, the Court pulled back slightly from the pure libertarian
model as it upheld a government restriction on the use of trade names.
In Friedman v. Rogers,295 it held that the government could prohibit the
use of trade names by optometrists because they were essentially
non-informational advertising devices with a potential for deception.
It now appears that the Burger Court will use the First Amend-
ment to require the government to treat economic entities in a manner
similar to individuals in the area of political or social speech. When
individuals or business entities seek to use trade names or engage in
advertising practices that employ words or symbols which do not in
themselves convey truthful information, the Court will uphold govern-
mental regulation of the activity if the regulation arguably relates to
preventing deception of the public. Whenever the regulated commer-
cial speech involves the conveyance of truthful information about a
lawful product, the ability of government to restrain the speech will
depend on whether the justices believe that the regulation is reasonable
in terms of avoiding actual fraud. While the Court has not opened the
door to overturning all economic regulations under the guise of First
Amendment rulings, it will play a significant, independent role in de-
termining the extent to which the speech activities of commercial inter-
ests may be regulated in order to protect the public from deceptive
business practices.
Conclusion: Neutral Principles and the Future of Supreme
Court Value Selection
In retrospect it should not be surprising to find that the Burger
Court has been more active than the Warren Court in reviewing the
actions of other institutions of government, because a libertarian court
faces more challenges in the modern world than does a liberal court.
After all, there are only a relatively small group of goals which a liberal
court could hope to define and promote; we saw that the Warren Court
rulings were limited to relatively narrow areas. However, the liberta-
rian court finds itself surrounded on all sides by government regula-
tions of individual and group activities which seem to contradict its
philosophy of personal and economic liberty.
In examining the work of the historic Warren and Burger Courts, I
294. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) with In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
295. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
Winter 19801 NEW LIBERTARIAN SUPREME COURT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
have focused on the results of decisions rather than the reasoning em-
ployed by the Courts or individual justices in opinions issued in these
cases. This approach does not reflect a belief that the reasoning of the
justices is unimportant, but only a belief that it is impossible for citi-
zens, scholars, or judges to evaluate current opinions of the Court un-
less they have first placed the Court in the historical perspective of its
value selection and philosophical orientation. This Term the Burger
Court will examine the decision of Congress to set aside funds for mi-
nority business 296 and the California Supreme Court's diminution of
property rights of shopping center owners through the requirement that
they allow speakers on their property. 97 The justices must recognize
their value orientation and find a means for internally questioning
whether their libertarian principles, with which these programs conflict,
can be made into enforceable constitutional doctrines. Only by heed-
ing Herbert Wechsler's call for decision making and opinion writing
based upon "neutral principles" 298 is the Court going to be successful
in avoiding a serious conflict with other branches of the government
and society at large.
I will not attempt to add to the debate concerning Wechsler's con-
ception of neutral principles. The historical and analytical worth of
that doctrine and the need for a system of "reasoned elaboration" have
been analyzed most ably in recent years by Professors Greenawalt 299
and White.3 00 But it is critical to note that Wechsler offered the
Supreme Court a means for questioning its role in the selection of the
values which restrict the development of a democratic consensus. The
use of specific doctrine and neutral principles of adjudication in
Supreme Court decisions will serve as an internal institutional check on
the exercise of power which cannot be justified in terms of constitu-
tional doctrine but only in terms of the selection of efficient govern-
mental policy. The open specification of doctrine allows the Court to
296. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979).
See note 244 supra.
297. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3319 (1979) (No. 79-289, Nov. 11, 1979).
298. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1959).
299. Greenwalt, The Enduring Signfficance of NeutralPrincioles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982
(1978).
300. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973). See also White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to
Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L.
REv. 999 (1972). Both articles are reprinted in G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT (1978).
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interact with society in what Professor White has called a "dialectic of
adjudication." '' An honestly written opinion employing specific doc-
trine allows members of the public to know why their actions, or the
actions of their government, are restricted; it does less damage to the
computing principle that is the basis of the democratic process than
does a decision which disguises the Court's reasoning or its manner of
value selection.
It may seem easier and more efficient for the Supreme Court to
simply rule on constitutional issues without attempting to create spe-
cific constitutional doctrine or explain its rulings in terms of neutral
principles. As we begin the new decade, it may appear to many per-
sons that the Supreme Court's authority is so well accepted that there is
no longer a need for internal checks in the value selection process that
is a part of constitutional adjudication. However, those who hold this
belief would do well to remember that before each of the Supreme
Court's major conflicts with society it had for decades ruled on a vari-
ety of policy issues and its rulings had been readily accepted by the
populace. In the period prior to Dred Scott v. Sandford,30 2 the Court
had become comfortable with the exercise of power in ruling on state
commercial cases based upon its view of the competing federal and
state interests.3"3 Prior to the Court's conflict with the New Deal ad-
301. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, supra note 300, at 296.
Recently Professor Owen Fiss has advanced a theory of constitutional decisionmaking
that, like Professor White's, rests on the concept of federal judges engaging in a dialectic
with society. Fiss, Foreword.- The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). One might
claim that Professor Fiss should be grouped with those I have termed "new realists" earlier
in this article because he seems to give no standard for judging the outcome of constitutional
decisionmaking other than the assertion that justices are to "give meaning to our public
values" in a way that neither reflects personal or societal preferences but, instead, gives a
correct definition of those values. Id at 9-15. Indeed, Professor Fiss seeks to answer Profes-
sor Ely's critique of judicial value selection, supra notes 19, 39, by asserting that "there is no
discernible connection between majoritarianism and the meaning of a constitutional value"
and citing Ely as one of the (presumably mislead) "promoters of footnote four." Id at 15 n.
33. It would be unfair to attack Professor Fiss as being only a realist because he finds the
basis of judicial legitimacy to be society's acceptance of a system of government which has
developed a judiciary with a special competence for considering questions of "structural
reform" and which needs that entity to examine problems of structural justice. Fiss thus
differs from consensus theorists by justifying the judicial role in terms of society acceptance
of institutions rather than specific values. Justification of a judicial role in terms of society's
establishment of institutions that interact to define constitutional values, and promote the
public good, is the core of Professor White's concept of a dialectic of adjudication.
302. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For an analysis of the decision in terms of the
Supreme Court's treatment of slavery and racial issues, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG,
supra note 10, at 535-40.
303. For an analysis of the Court's rulings during this period, see R. MCCLOSKEY, supra
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ministration, it had for over thirty years approved or disapproved regu-
lations of individual and economic liberty without specifying a
constitutional doctrine that separated acceptable from unacceptable de-
viations from libertarian principles."° I do not claim that the Court is
headed for another such cataclysmic confrontation with society. But it
is noteworthy that the libertarian Burger Court has moved away from
the use of enunciated constitutional doctrine to the use of balancing or
fact related tests in ruling on the nature of the federal commerce
power,3 °5 the meaning of the contract clause,30 6 the nature of the proce-
dural due process guarantees, 0 7 equal protection theories regarding
both group discrimination 0 8 and fundamental rights,30 9 and the mean-
ing of the free speech guarantee.3  Unless the Burger Court makes
some effort to heed Wechsler's call for the use of neutral principles of
adjudication in its decision making and opinion writing, it may well
become too comfortable with the exercise of power for its own or soci-
ety's good.
note 11, at 81-97; B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-77
(1942).
304. For an analysis of the Court's rulings during this period, see R. MCCLOSKEY, supra
note 11, at 136-79; B. WRIGHT, supra note 303, at 109-36, 153-79.
305. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
306. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court appears to be taking a similar approach to
interpretation of the taking clause, compare Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979) with
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979).
307. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See notes 140-56 and accompanying text
supra.
308. Compare Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) with Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
1 (1977) (alienage cases). Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) with Weber v. AetnaCas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy). Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (gender).
309. See, e.g., Holt Civil Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (voting); Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (privacy-contraception). Compare Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (travel) with Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974). Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage) with Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
310. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulation of broadcast
of "offensive" speech); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (attorney solicitation); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (defamation-public figures).
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